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KICKSTARTER MY HEART: EXTRAORDINARY
POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF
CROWDFUNDING CONSTRAINTS AND BITCOIN
BUBBLES
DAVID GROSHOFF*
ABSTRACT
This Article builds on my existing research program that (a) broadly
seeks to analyze laws, regulations, instruments, and policy levers that inhibit a market’s ability to recognize an asset’s intrinsic value, whether in terms
of financial, social, or human capital, and (b) explores and advances interdisciplinary corporate governance theories by employing a heterodox economic analytic to derive its proposal to the paradox of an unregulated virtual currency market (Bitcoins) and an overly regulated crowdfunding
market (Kickstarter).
The Article functions not only as an homage to Charles MacKay’s legendary 1841 book, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of
Crowds, which described the human, social, and economic psychology of
financial bubbles—particularly the Dutch tulip bulb bubble—but also as
an offering of problems and proposals that crowdfunded and Kickstarted
entrepreneurial businesses, including those funded by Bitcoin currencies,
present for a wide swath of societal stakeholders.
To describe the problem, this Article (i) describes behavioral finance,
(ii) details the new entrepreneurial business possibilities that virtual currencies and crowdfunded entities can explore, (iii) describes how current
rules and regulations represent unnecessary constraints to traditional
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equity-based funding models and concerning governance models of entrepreneurial enterprises, and (iv) questions why one form of capital deployment (currencies) may provide equity-like returns and unique governance,
while the other form of investing (crowdfunding), provides only softdollar-like returns and no governance for middle-class investors. While
both virtual currencies and crowdfunding represent risks, including economic bubble risk, this Article believes that a heterodox economic analysis
demonstrates unnecessary constraints on entrepreneurial businesses imposed by extant regulation, regulators, law, and policymakers. To assuage
these paradoxic problems for emerging business enterprises, this Article
proposes a minarchist heterodox solution of modest statutory language
that requires market-based solutions that employ needed risk reduction
strategies while redeploying necessary capital to private startup business
enterprises. This proposal thus benefits the middle class entrepreneurs,
suppliers of capital, and job seekers harmed by the current regulatory regime, while permitting for an expansion of the U.S. and global economies.
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INTRODUCTION
Money ... has often been a cause of the delusion of multitudes. Sober
nations have all at once become desperate gamblers, and risked almost
their existence upon the turn of a piece of paper.1
—Charles Mackay
Time magazine published an article in April 2013 indicating that many
reasons explain why an online virtual currency “is a classic bubble” and
that “[m]any compare it to tulip mania in 17th century Holland, where
prices of rare tulip bulbs soared to absurd heights and then crashed,” destroying the lives of those who purchased tulip bulbs.2 “But the Bitcoin
phenomenon is more than a bubble[,]” the piece continued.3 “It says something important about the current and future state of the global economy.”4
Famously detailing both Holland’s tulip bubble, as well as the bubble’s underpinnings in human economic and socio-psychological behavior,
eighteenth century author Charles Mackay penned the legendary book,
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds.5 The tome
not only discussed hundreds of government-authorized economic bubbles
that involved massive fraud, but also described the delusional behavior of
human economic actors in the midst of economic bubbles.6 While financial instruments, markets, business structures, and regulatory regimes have
changed materially since Mackay’s work in the 1840s, sadly, the irrational
1

1 CHARLES MACKAY, MEMOIRS OF EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE
MADNESS OF CROWDS VIII (London, Robson, Levey, & Franklyn 2d ed. 1852).
2
Michael Sivy, The Real Significance of the Bitcoin Boom (and Bust), TIME (Apr. 12, 2013),
http://business.time.com/2013/04/12/the-real-significance-of-the-bitcoin-boom-and-bust/.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
MACKAY, supra note 1. A speculative bubble is “a spike in asset values” and is
generally “caused by exaggerated expectation of future growth, price appreciation, or other
events ....” This in turn causes increased trading as investors have a heightened expectation
of value, “pushing prices above what an objective analysis of the intrinsic value would
suggest.” Speculative Bubble, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/spec
ulativebubble.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). Some of the more famous bubbles include
Tulipmania (1634–38), the Mississippi Bubble (1719–20), the South Sea Bubble (1720),
the Bull Market of the Roaring Twenties (1924–29), and the Japanese “Bubble Economy”
(1984–89). Famous Bubbles: from Tulipmania to Japan’s “Bubble Economy”, FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dotcon/historical/bubbles.html (last visited
Feb. 24, 2014).
6
See generally MACKAY, supra note 1.
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behavior of economic actors transacting on imperfect information has
seemingly remained static.
Of Western economies’ myriad government-involved economic bubbles, perhaps no other work besides Extraordinary Popular Delusions and
the Madness of Crowds could serve as both the foundation and overlay to
advance the analysis for this Article’s thesis. That analysis lies at the nexus of two competing tensions relative to U.S. government regulation concerning economic bubbles. Specifically, this Article addresses the U.S.
federal government’s apparent contradictory—and perhaps even delusional—behavior when comparing the over-regulation (only partly assuaged in
the 2012 JOBS Act)7 in nascent capital formation platforms—popularly
known as crowdfunding—with a near-stunning regulatory absence over
decentralized convertible virtual crypto-currencies, the most common of
which is presently Bitcoin.8
The government should maintain consistency when regulating, rightregulating, deregulating—or not regulating—alleged statutory goals relating to investment and capital deployment. In 2013 many painful demonstrations of these inconsistencies occurred as illustrated by popular culture’s increased focus on crowdfunding’s largest current platform,
Kickstarter, and e-currencies’ largest player, Bitcoin.9 As the U.S. and
7

Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126
Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
8
See infra, Part I.
9
INOCENTE (Fine Films 2012). The film won an Oscar in 2013 for Best Documentary
Short Subject. ‘Inocente' Wins Oscar: Best 'Documentary Short Subject' Tells Story Of
Young Undocumented Latina Artist, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2013, 11:10 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/24/inocente-wins-oscar_n_2756514.html.
Crowdfunding for the project on Kickstarter raised $52,257, exceeding its goal of $50,000.
Inocente: Homeless. Creative. Unstoppable, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com
/projects/1131717127/inocente-homeless-creative-unstoppable (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
Two other Kickstarter funded films were also nominated for awards: KINGS POINT (Sara
Gilman 2012) and BUZKASHI BOYS (Afghan Film Project 2012). 2012 Nominations by
Film, AND THE OSCAR GOES TO …, http://atogt.com/askoscar/dnoms.ph p?yr=85 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014). See also Linda Holmes, Pop Culture Happy Hour: Kickstarter TV
and Comedy Contests, NPR (Mar. 22, 2013, 11:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/monke
ysee/2013/03/22/175035168/pop-culture-happy-hour-kickstarter-tv-and-comedy-contests;
Alyson Shontell, The 20 Most Successful Projects in Kickstarter History, THE ATLANTIC
(July 12, 2011, 7:39 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology /archive/2011/07/the-20
-most-successful-projects-in-kickstarter-history/241789/#slide15 (“The most popular projects
were documentaries and iPhone accessories.”); Spike Lee Seeks $1.25 Million on
Kickstarter for Film about “Addiction to Blood”, POP CULTURE BRAIN, http://popcul
turebrain.com/post/56153908180/spike-lee-seeks-1-25-million-on-kickstarter-for-film (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014); Jon Matonis, Top 10 Bitcoin Merchant Sites, FORBES (May 24,
2013, 12:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2013/05/24/top-10-bitcoin-merc
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global economies attempted to ascend from the Great Recession, despite
the popular media and cultural coverage, U.S. federal agencies appeared
oblivious about how to act in the face of the swiftly moving practical realities impacting global economic redevelopment.10
First, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seemingly
moved at a snail’s pace to provide particular delayed-yet-statutorilyrequired (and material) regulatory changes mandated under the JOBS Act,
hant-sites/; Kashmir Hill, Living On Bitcoin For A Week: The Expense Report, FORBES
(May 17, 2013, 3:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashm irhill/2013/05/17/livingon-bitcoin-for-a-week-the-expense-report/.
10
This Article blends various analytics of development economics to support its
thesis. Amplifying traditional economists (Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Piero Sraffa,
Gunnar Myrdal, John Maynard Keynes, Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman) to
analyze how current laws, regulations, and policies may function in the context of a
fragile global economy’s (re)development, I included, among others, Duncan Kennedy,
David Kennedy, Joseph Stiglitz, and Deepak Lal. Lal’s influential work has been called a
socio-economic blend of market failure policy analysis that Joseph Stiglitz later
employed in Stiglitz’s market failure policy analysis criticizing market signals in favor of
political socio-cultural signals in economic development. See Deepak Lal, The Dirigiste
Dogma, in THE POVERTY OF ‘DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS’ 39 (1985); Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Participation and Development: Perspectives from The Comprehensive Development
Paradigm, 6 REV. OF DEV. ECON. 163 (2002); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Senior Vice President &
Chief Economist, Keynote Address at the World Bank Annual Bank Conf. on Dev.
Econ.: Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition 63–64 (Apr. 28–30, 1999),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTABCDEWASHINGTON1999/Resources/stiglitz.p
df. Heterodox international development law scholar David Kennedy asserted that “[a]
great deal of law was required to translate the leading economic theories of development
into policy[,] ... [which] demanded the creation of numerous public law institutions,
established by statute and implemented by public law bureaucracies: exchange controls,
credit licensing schemes, ... tax incentives ... national commodity monopolies,” that
legislation needed to occur to achieve these ends, and “[a] vastly expanded administrative
apparatus, with rule making, licensing, and other legal authority would need to be set up,”
whether among Keynesian liberals, dirigiste leftists, centrists, or the neoliberal “Chicago
School” devotees, and argued that all sides advocated legal intervention in an economic
system to implement their respective political goals. David Kennedy, “The Rule of Law,”
Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 95, 102 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds.,
2006). See also id. at 151, 153 (synthesizing Lal and Stiglitz). Duncan Kennedy’s critical
legal studies view led to his assertion that social law coordinated classical legal thought
stakeholders via “public agencies that were to make rules to instantiate relatively abstract
and vague legislative pronouncements (for example, in the U.S. context, a federal statute
banning ... ‘deceptive practices’ in securities law)” and left civil libertarians to “attack[]
the institutions as denying individual rights and the administrators as arbitrary and
implicitly authoritarian manipulators of vacuous general standards and empty expertise.”
Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 84–85 (David M.
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
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relative to how businesses may solicit investor capital.11 In the Obama
Administration’s second term, beginning in 2009, President Obama appointed and received Senate confirmation for the first SEC director in U.S.
history with experience as a former federal prosecutor.12 Perhaps as an unsurprising result, rather than imbue a focus on implementing the rules and
regulations required of the SEC within the timeline stated in the JOBS
Act, which became law in 2012, during 2013, the SEC instead appeared to
focus its admittedly limited resources on high-profile prosecutions of alleged perpetrators of insider trading, a victimless crime in an efficient
market.13 The JOBS Act’s hailed panacea appears to represent a net detriment to, rather than protection of, middle-class U.S. investors, entrepreneurs, and job-seekers, thereby harming national economic redevelopment
under a statute unmistakably called the JOBS Act.
Second, in March 2013, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN), applied the authority granted to it under the Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA)14 and issued new interpretive guidelines15 under longstanding provisions
11

See Ben Goad, SEC Accused of Dawdling on JOBS Act Enabling Rules, THE HILL
(Apr. 4, 2013, 4:01 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/finance/293415-gop-lawmake
r-sec-moving-too-slow-on-jobs-act-rules; Michelle Quinn, Slow-moving SEC Blamed for
Blocking JOBS Act, POLITICO (Apr. 9, 2013, 4:43 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/20
13/04/slow-moving-sec-blamed-for-blocking-jobs-act-89769.html; Robb Mandelbaum,
‘Crowdfunding’ Rules Are Unlikely to Meet Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2012, at B1.
12
See Susan Crabtree & Tim Devaney, Obama Picks Ex-prosecutor to Head SEC,
WASH. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/24/obama
-picks-top-prosecutor-head-sec/?page=all; Dina ElBoghdady, Mary Jo White Confirmed
as SEC Chief, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-0
8/business/38373590_1_mary-jo-white-al-franken-credit-rating-agency-industry.
13
Emily Flitter et al., U.S. Charges SAC Capital with Insider Trading Crimes, REUTERS
(July 25, 2013, 7:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/25/us-sac-fundcharges-i dUSBRE96O0SD20130725; Peter Lattman & William Alden, 2 Ex-Hedge Fund
Traders Are Found Guilty in Insider Trading Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, at B1;
LibertyPen, John Stossel - The Case For Insider Trading, YOUTUBE (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://www .youtube.com/watch?v=P68zqj13XaU (quoting Milton Friedman who said in
2003: “You should want more insider trading, not less. You want to give the people the
most likely to have the knowledge about deficiencies of the company an incentive to make
the public aware of that.”); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248–49, 253–55
(1988) (embracing the efficient market theory for equities, but concurrence warning of using
this theory); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING (Found. Press
1999).
14
See Treas. Order 180-01 (Mar. 24, 2003), available at http://www.treasury.gov
/about/role-of-treasury/orders-directives/Pages/to180-01.aspx.
15
U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001,
GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING,
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.fincen.gov
/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf (attempting to clarify “the applicability of
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of the BSA16 and—only two months later, in May 2013—indicted and
seized the assets of a decentralized convertible virtual currency exchange
(yet again, in a high-profile manner for the mainstream media).17 The world
of crypto-currencies serves as a sharp departure from a single federal government that logically ought to be striving to accomplish one related policy
objective. The extant regulatory world represents a puzzlingly complex, divided, and therefore futile, administrative regime, inconsequential in its attempts to affect meaningful disincentives from any crowd madness that may
fuel speculative economic bubbles in a still fragile economy.18 Perhaps
some, or all, of these events led to a bipartisan Senate demand of the Obama
administration on August 13, 2013, for “a holistic and whole-government
approach to understand and provide a sensible regulatory framework,”
which included, among other agencies, the Federal Reserve, the SEC, and
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).19
Part I of this Article articulates the history and context of behavioral
economics and finance that has underpinned human economic behavior
from tulipmania through today. Part II analyzes new virtual currencies and
payment systems unimagined by nearly any law or regulation currently
existing. Part III describes the concept of crowdfunding and identifies many
legal provisions that have hindered equity-based crowdfunding of legitimate
the regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act (‘BSA’) to persons creating, obtaining,
distributing, exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual currencies. Such persons are
referred to ... as ‘users,’ ‘administrators,’ and ‘exchangers,’” but “[a] user of a virtual
currency is not an MSB [Money Service Business] under FinCEN’s regulations and
therefore is not subject to MSB registration, reporting, and recordkeeping regulations.”
Having said that, “an administrator or exchanger is an MSB under FinCEN’s regulations,”
and “[a]n administrator or exchanger is not a ... dealer in foreign exchange, under FinCEN’s
regulations.”). This matter is detailed, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
16
31 U.S.C.A. § 5330(a)(1) (West 2014) (“Any person who owns or controls a money
transmitting business shall register the business (whether or not the business is licensed as a
money transmitting business in any State” with FinCEN)); see also Amendment to the
Bank Secrecy Act Regulations-Definitions Relating to, and Registration of, Money Services
Businesses, 64 Fed. Reg. § 45438 n.1 (Aug. 20, 1999) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. §103);
31 C.F.R. § 1022.380 (2011).
17
See, e.g., US Prosecutes ‘$6bn Money-Laundering Hub’, BBC NEWS TECH. (May
28, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22686777?print=true; see also
Redacted AUSA Application with Exhibits, Redacted Domain SW, Redacted Injunction
Order, Redacted PIRO, Related Exchanger Website Domain Names Redacted Filed
Complaint, Indictment-Redacted, United States v. Liberty Reserve, No. 13 Crim. 368
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May13/Libe
rtyReserveetalDocuments.php.
18
See discussion of Bitcoins and other electronic currencies, supra note 9.
19
Timothy B. Lee, Congress Starts Investigating Bitcoin, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2013,
12:26 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/13/congress
-starts-investigating-bitcoin/.
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businesses, thereby harming middle-class entrepreneurs, investors, job
seekers, workers, and constraining economic production possibilities frontiers. Part IV synthesizes the ostensible cognitive dissonance between the
government’s crowdfunding restrictions and its refusal to regulate virtual
currencies, such as Bitcoins. This Part presents a heterodox-inspired solution that borrows from what I believe to be the best of both regulated and
unregulated policy in the U.S. to achieve maximum freedom with corresponding protection for the U.S. middle-class and broader economy. The
Article concludes that specific re-regulatory schemes may provide workable
solutions not only to stem the excessive volatility of Bitcoin bubbles but
also to kickstart the heart of crowdfunding, thus advancing economic development via entrepreneurship, job creation, new internal governance
ideas, and investment opportunities with traditional equity-like returns.
I. OVERVIEW OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND ECONOMICS
A. Descriptive and Comparative Analysis of Behavioral Finance
Behavioral Finance and Economics (BFE) broadly refers to interdisciplinary academic discussion and model development of human psychology
and financial markets.20 BFE was developed after certain academic researchers, perhaps when climbing down the ladders from their ivory towers,
noticed that economic actors do not necessarily act as neoclassical economics predicts. For instance, they act neither with perfect information nor in a
perfectly rational manner.21 These anomalies did not exist in earlier modern
economic and financial theories, including the efficient market theory,22 the
utility theory,23 or homo economicus.24
20

Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J.
ECON. PERSP. 83, 90–91 (2003).
21
Id. at 96–97.
22
See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral
Finance, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 284 (1998) (stating that the efficient market theory’s
premise that prices fully reflect available information and noting errors including not
considering information-processing biases that may cause an investor to overreact or
underreact to an asset’s market price in comparison to other investors’ reactions to the
same asset’s market price).
23
See, e.g., Behavioral Finance vs. Traditional Finance Theory, MARKET REALIST,
http://marketrealist.com/behavioral-finance-micro-bfmi-behavioral-finance-macro-bfma/
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (describing the utility theory’s assumption that investors make
economic decisions in a consistent and independent manner relative to other potentially
useful choices, resulting in the investor exercising the same decisions, even when
combining or weighing unfavorable outcomes with other, more favorable decisions).
24
See Maurice E. Stucke, Virtual Symposium Foreword: The Rise of Behavioral Law
and Economics, 13 TENN. J. BUS. L. 309, 309 (2012) (indicating that homo economicus
assumes that a purported average investor acts rationally and only as a self-interested
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In contrast, BFE advocates assert that theory must include not only
economics and finance but also the psychological theories accounting for
social norms, emotions, and myriad extraneous factors influencing individual economic decision-making.25 Scholars including Daniel Kahneman,
Terrance Odean, and Brad Barber, indicate that BFE theory “closely combines individual behavior and market phenomena and uses knowledge taken from both the psychological field and financial theory.”26 As opposed
to employing the neoclassical economic assumption that economic actors’
choices always result from rational decision-making, BFE scholars leverage novel data that help explain investor judgment to encourage behavioral modifications among investors to achieve a more rational and profit
maximizing outcome.27 Neoclassical theory asserts that irrational decisions represent judgments inexplicable under a “normative rationality” of
profit maximization.28
BFE contends, however, that investors cannot make decisions or process
information without interjecting individual human biases or emotions.29
Macro-level BFE research involves investors’ psychological biases that
may cloud an economic decision,30 while micro-level BFE metadata posit
profit-maximizer, with great willpower). Overall, scholars of modern finance including
the late Herbert Simon, a political scientist and professor of psychology at CarnegieMellon University, argue that people are “boundedly rational … [by] us[ing] their
resources in sensible ways to adjust to the prevailing situational demands.” Tommy
Gärling, et. al, Psychology, Financial Decision Making, and Financial Crises, 10
PSYCHOL. SCI. IN PUB. INT. 1, 6 (2010).
25
Why Behavioral Finance is Relevant to the Investor, MARKET REALIST, http://market
realist.com/risks/behavioral-risks/why-behavioral-finance-is-relevant-to-the-individual-in
vestor/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
26
Hubert Fromlet, The Behavioral Finance-Theory and Practical Application:
Systematic Analysis of Departure from the Homo Economicus Program Are Essential for
Realistic Financial Research and Analysis, 36 BUS. ECON. 63, 65 (2001).
27
See Why Behavioral Finance is Relevant to the Investor, supra note 25.
28
Roy Sembel & Irwan Trinugroho, Overconfidence and Excessive Trading
Behavior: An Experimental Study, 6 INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT. 147, 147 (2011). Having said
that, as controversial economist Amartya Sen indicated:
[It is simply not adequate to take as our basic objective just the maximization of income or wealth, which is, as Aristotle noted, ‘merely useful and for the sake of something else.’ For the same reason, economic
growth cannot sensibly be treated as an end in itself .... [It must] be
more concerned with enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we
enjoy. Expanding the freedoms that we have reason to value not only
makes our lives richer and more unfettered, but also allows us to be
fuller social persons, exercising our own volitions and interacting
with—and influencing—the world in which we live.
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 14–15 (1999).
29
See Why Behavioral Finance is Relevant to the Investor, supra note 25.
30
See Sembel, supra note 28.
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several reasons to explain why investors make irrational economic decisions.31 Erik Gerding argued that these types of irrational investors are
“unsophisticated investors [who] trade on ‘noise’—information not related
to assessing the fundamental value of assets.”32 Gerding referred to irrational investors as “noise traders” who “evaluate whether to buy or sell
assets based on price trends, emotions, or estimations about what other
investors in the market will do.”33
The existing research base relative to investors who make irrational
decisions under neoclassical economic theory suggests the cause is a panoply of psychological biases: anchoring,34 overconfidence,35 hindsight,36
31

See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–78 (1998); see also Steve Christ,
Behavioral Finance Theory: 11 Reasons Why What You Think Could Be Wrong, WEALTH
DAILY (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.wealthdaily.com/articles/behavioral-finance-theory/1929.
32
Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-Market Approach
to Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 977, 995 (2007).
33
Id. Having worked on an institutional investor trading floor for over a decade, I
occasionally witnessed hugely successful professional investors make economic
decisions based on emotional factors, price trends, and ideas of what competitors could
be doing. Yet I would never refer to my former colleagues as anything remotely
approaching “irrational” investors, “noise traders,” or unsophisticated economic actors
because of making such decisions from time to time, and their track record evidences
superior asset management. See Mutual Fund Quote: JPMorgan High Yield Select,
MORNING STAR, http:// quotes.morningstar.com/fund/OHYFX/f?t=OHYFX (last visited
Feb. 24, 2014).
34
See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, SuperBias: The Collision of Behavioral Economics and
Implicit Social Cognition, 45 AKRON L. REV. 591, 602 (2012) (indicating that anchoring
occurs when uninformative numbers influence economic actors, and “[a]nchoring effects
are caused by the increased accessibility of information related to an anchor. When people
see an anchor, they first quickly evaluate whether it might be the correct response. As part
of this process, people rely on their memories to recall instances that might confirm the
truth (or prove the untruth) of the anchor. Thus, investors anchor on the latest information
or events as to what a particular [asset] may be worth.” The rationale is that investors are
uninformed, not because of insufficient information, but rather because of too much
information, which irrationally affects their economic decision making). See also David
John Marotta, Behavioral Finance: Anchoring, MAROTTA WEALTH MGMT. (July 21, 2008),
http://www.emarotta.com/behavioral-finance-anchoring-2/.
35
In BFE, “overconfidence” refers to “the tendency of decision makers to unwittingly
give excessive weight to the assessment of knowledge and accuracy of information
possessed and ignore the public information available.” Roy Sembel & Irwan
Trinugroho, Overconfidence and Excessive Trading Behavior: An Experimental Study, 6
INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT. 147, 148 (July 2011). Thus, an investor’s overconfidence may
lead that investor to mistakenly believe the investor can control a particular situation
when doing so is impossible. See Fromlet, supra note 26, at 63, 66.
Simply put, “people think they know more than they do,” which leads to an irrational
decision, ignorant of risk analysis. Fromlet, supra note 26, at 66 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Overconfidence also may explain an investor’s large number of trades, and those
large numbers’ correlation with poor investment performance. See Brad M. Barber &
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representativeness,37 and perhaps most apparent to popular observers of
the economy and investment markets, herding effects.38 These BFE biases
Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment
Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. OF FIN. 773, 773–74, (2000). Barber and Odean
reasoned that “[o]verconfident investors will overestimate the value of their private
information, causing them to trade too actively and, consequently, to earn below-average
returns.” Id. at 800. Yet when investors receive below-average returns, the investors often
blame the result on bad luck or other people. The Perils for Investors of Human Nature
People Tend to Take the Credit for Success and Blame Failure on Bad Luck. The Resulting
Overconfidence Can Be Dangerous, Warn Simon Gervais and Terrance Odean, FIN. TIMES,
June 18, 2001, at 2.
Sex-based overconfidence bias exists, as well. Specifically, “men claim more ability
[to invest] than do women.” Terry Odean, Address at Legg Mason Funds Management
Investment Conference: What I Know About How You Invest (Nov. 2003). Yet studies
evidence that “males not only sell their investments at the wrong time but also experience
higher trading costs than their female counterparts.” Victor Ricciardi & Helen K. Simon,
What Is Behavioral Finance?, 2 BUS., EDUC., & TECH. J., Fall 2000, at 4. Additional
research indicated that “over a six-year period, men on average traded 45% more than
women,” and men were reducing their net returns by 1 percentage point more per year
than women. Michael M. Pompian & John M. Longo, A New Paradigm for Practical
Application of Behavioral Finance: Creating Investment Programs Based on Personality
Type and Gender to Produce Better Investment Outcomes, 7 J. WEALTH MGMT., Fall
2004, at 10; see also Victor Reklaitis, Investing Problems: Men, Overconfidence and
Trading, INVESTOR’S CORNER (2012), http://education.investors.com/investors-corner
/602404-men-often-overconfident-in-investing.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). An
annual difference of one percent compounded over an investing lifetime represents a
meaningful return differential.
36
Hindsight bias suggests that when investors know how a particular situation may
turn out, investors subsequently cannot disregard that information in future decisionmaking contexts, regardless of the probability or magnitude of the occurrence. To
illustrate, researchers asked Washington, D.C. residents, two months after suffering a
small earthquake in 2010, their thoughts concerning the likelihood of another earthquake
in Washington, D.C. the following year. Even though the probability of another
earthquake affecting those residents one year later was quite small, the earthquake’s
personal impact resulted in residents over-estimating the likelihood. Levinson, supra note
34, at 595–600.
37
Representativeness bias refers to “the tendency of individuals to classify things into
discrete groups based on similar characteristics,” thereby focusing on similarities, rather
than independent characteristic variables. Wesley S. Chan, Richard M. Frankel, & S.P.
Kothari, Testing Behavioral Finance Theories Using Trends and Sequences in Financial
Performance (Mass. Inst. of Tech. (“M.I.T.”) Sloan School of Mgmt., Working Paper No.
4375-02, June 2003). For example, investors may fail to incorporate matching quantitative
or qualitative information in their predictions, and fail to realize extreme observations are
unlikely to be repeated. Id. Investors subsequently become disappointed with the belowaverage returns they received because the investors “mentally misplace[d] firms into
various groups based on the past performance,” regardless of the statistical significance of
such past performance. Id. at 21.
38
Perhaps the most frequently apparent BFE observation is “herd behavior.” Fromlet,
supra note 26, at 63, 66. Herd behavior is best described as “following the crowd.”
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often can represent superior explanations of market price changes compared to the ambiguously phrased “prices fully reflect available information.”39 These various biases, particularly those that cause growthbased spiraling behaviors demonstrated in BFE research may help to contextualize both the causes and the effects of economic bubbles in which
investors may find themselves.
B. Linkage Between Psychological Biases and Financial Bubble
Definitions
While psychological biases explain the phenomena of financial bubbles, financial bubbles—sometimes referred to as speculative or market
bubbles—occur when “a broad-based, surging euphoria or wave of optimism carries asset prices well beyond supportable value.”40 Erik Gerding
provided one explanation of how bubbles form by using two actors: noise
traders,41 as referenced above, and so-called “smart money”:
First, a “displacement”—either an external macroeconomic or political
event or good news about a specific industry—causes corporate profits
to rise. Investors with superior information make conspicuous gains as
share prices rise. Noise traders, attracted by rising prices, enter the
market and bid prices even higher, adopting positive-feedback investment strategies. Informed investors and arbitrageurs (known as “smart
money”) anticipate noise-trader demand and bid-up prices in advance
of noise traders, further stimulating demand. When smart money senses

Andreas Park & Hamid Sabourian, Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial
Markets, 79 ECONOMETRICA 973, 974 (2011). In these situations, investors may have
substantial information on a particular event or situation, yet the information is
“swamped” when they observe others acting contrary to the information retained by the
investor. Id. Herding bias goes against the assumption of a rational investor because the
realistic investor will irrationally choose to ignore information that may better predict the
result of possible innovations and waste investment capital theorizing that so many others
are going to do it. See Gerding, supra note 32, at 996–97. Herding thus creates a vicious
cycle, “[i]f prices of an asset rise, investors who pursue these strategies bid prices higher
as they base their analysis on the asset-price trend. The resulting rise in prices further
increases demand among … [other irrational investors], and a [positive] feedback loop
develops.” Gerding, supra note 32, at 997. In the end, the market crashes and everyone is
disappointed in their below average return, justifying their failures by the fact that
everyone else was negatively affected by the drop in price. Cf. MACKAY, supra note 1
and accompanying text (explaining the Tulip bulb bubble).
39
Eugene F. Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral Finance,
49 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 284 (1998).
40
Adam Nash, Behavioral Finance Explains Bubbles, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 20, 2013), http
://techcrunch.com/2013/04/20/what-can-behavioral-finance-can-teach-us-about-bubbles/.
41
See supra notes 32–33.
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the market overheating, it sells. Ultimately, noise traders follow and,
once a tipping point is reached, prices crash.42

Regardless of precisely how bubbles form, evidence strongly suggests
that “[b]ubbles…have an emotional component ....”43 A bubble’s emotional
components can be explained by applying some of the psychological biases
described above:
x
x
x
x

x

First, applying anchoring bias, an investor becomes aware of
a random number about a new financial innovation and gravitates in that direction when investing in the new fad.44
Second, an investor displays overconfidence when investing
in a developing economic bubble by overestimating selfintelligence and relative investing capabilities.45
Third, an investor applies hindsight bias and over-emphasizes
a past investing experience to the present or future predictability, even if the investor’s predictions are nearly impossible.46
Fourth, basing investment decisions on representativeness
bias, the investor would be unlikely to consider sufficiently
the relevant risks because the investor would fail to predict
accurately the odds of success in a new investment prior to
deploying sufficiently large amounts of capital.47
Fifth, and perhaps most noticeable, the investor likely would
mimic the actions of what “everyone else” was doing and
would engage in the herd behavior that often results in “selfreinforcing cycles of aggregate behavior,” even when quantitative and qualitative data demonstrates that the new fad
about to separate economic actors from their invested capital
is likely to fail.48

Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds contains
several chapters describing historical events evidencing the confluence of
herd behavior and financial bubbles.49 One example discussed the famous
“Mississippi Scheme,” in which French investors created an economic
42

Gerding, supra note 32, at 999.
Nash, supra note 40.
44
See id.
45
See id.
46
See id.
47
See id.
48
Id.
49
MACKAY, supra note 1.
43
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bubble via buying ownership interests in a trade company engaged in resource development from the Mississippi area.50 The French investors
turned huge profits until the entire market for ownership interests in the
venture collapsed. When the book turned to the most famous financial
bubble, Holland’s “Tulip Mania,” Mackay wrote, “in 1634, the rage
among the Dutch to possess [tulips] was so great that the ordinary industry
of the country was neglected, and the population, even to its lowest dregs,
embarked on the tulip trade.”51 Later in the same week that I submitted the
formal summer research grant proposal to fund this Article’s research,
Benjamin Radford briefly compared tulip bulbs to Bitcoins and wrote that
investors who saw the price of tulips exponentially increase.52 He believed
they could achieve the same results by purchasing more and more tulips,
thus creating a craze that attracted an increasing number of investors to
tulips at increasing prices.53 By 1637, however, the smart money sold their
tulips, and within weeks the tulip bubble burst.54 In describing tulip mania,
Radford stated that after the bubble burst, “[m]any [investors] were financially ruined, and the whole fiasco became an infamous textbook case of
investment speculation gone awry,” leaving readers with the ominous conclusion that “the tulip mania craze holds important lessons for economists
and sociologists—and maybe Bitcoin investors as well” as “[u]nlike [a]
Bitcoin[‘s virtual existence] ... [tulips] had the potential to actually exist.”55
II. CURRENCIES, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, AND BITCOINS
To understand what constitute “virtual currencies,”56 and what laws,
rules, regulations, and agency may apply and oversee such currencies, I believe that the reader would benefit from an explanation of the complex interplay among (i) currencies,57 which throughout history were often made with
50

Id. at B.
Id.
52
Benjamin Radford, Bitcoin Currency Inspires Tulip Mania Comparisons, DISCOVERY
NEWS (Apr. 16, 2013, 1:12 PM), http://news.discovery.com/history/bitcoins-and-dutch-tul
ipmania-lessons-in-investor-madness-130416.html.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
FinCEN Guidance FIN-2013-G001, supra note 15 (comparing FinCEN’s
description of a “real” currency possessing legal tender status as per 31 C.F.R. §
1010.100(m) with a “virtual” currency serving as an exchange medium lacking legal
tender status in any jurisdiction).
57
A currency has traditionally represented what a specific nationality employed as its
monopolistic legal tender. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF
MONEY 48, 90, 106 (Inst. of Econ. Affairs 3d ed. 1990); see also Andrew K. Rose, One
Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade, Seminar
51
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gold; (ii) commodities,58 of which gold is one example; and (iii) money,
which was backed by gold in the U.S. until the Bretton Woods collapse and
removal of the U.S. dollar from the gold standard in the early 1970s.59
A recent high profile and temperamental exchange between House
Subcommittee on Monetary Policy Chairman Ron Paul and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke—both Republicans—contextualizes the

Paper No. 678, 2–3 (Inst. for Int’l Econ. Studies 1999), available at http://su.diva-portal
.org/smash/get/diva2:328473/FULLTEXT01. In addition to the “real” and “virtual”
currencies described supra note 56, one may divide real currencies further by distinguishing
between “public” currencies, subject to government monopolies, and “private” currencies,
with private currencies being considered “concurrent” currencies. HAYEK at 26.
58
See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a (West 2014) (defining
commodities as: “wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums,
mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and
oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all other fats and
oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock
products, and frozen concentrated orange juice ... and all services, rights, and interests ...
in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”).
The film, Trading Places, arguably defined commodities simpler than the statute
(“[W]hat are commodities? Commodities are agricultural products … like coffee, that you
had for breakfast … wheat, which is used to make bread … pork bellies, which is used to
make bacon, which you might find in a ‘bacon, lettuce and tomato’ sandwich. And then
there are other commodities like, frozen orange juice ... and GOLD. Though, of course,
gold doesn’t grow on trees like oranges.”). TRADING PLACES (Paramount Pictures 1983).
In addition, the film served as the basis for the CFTC to change risk-based regulation of
commodities. See Hearing to Review Implementation of Changes to the Commodity
Exchange Act Contained in the 2008 Farm Bill before the Subcommittee on General
Farm Commodities and Risk Management of the Committee of Agriculture, 111th Cong.
2d. Sess. (statement of Hon. Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg55459/html
/CHRG-111hhrg55459.htm. Gensler stated that:
[w]e have recommended banning using misappropriated government
information to trade in the commodity markets. In the movie “Trading
Places,” starring Eddie Murphy, the Duke brothers intended to profit
from trades in frozen concentrated orange juice futures contracts using
an illicitly obtained and not yet public Department of Agriculture orange crop report. Characters played by Eddie Murphy and Dan
Aykroyd intercept the misappropriated report and trade on it to profit
and ruin the Duke brothers. In real life, using such misappropriated
government information actually is not illegal under our statute. To
protect our markets, we have recommended what we call the “Eddie
Murphy” rule to ban insider trading using nonpublic information misappropriated from a government source.
Id.
59
See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN, THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: PARADISE LOST?,
IN THE GOLD STANDARD IN THEORY AND HISTORY 313, 315–21 (Routledge, 2d ed. 1997).
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confusion among these terms, even among the highest ranking fiscal and
monetary policymakers in the U.S.:
Paul: Do you think gold is money?
Bernanke: [long pause] No.
....
Paul: Even if it has been money for 6,000 years, somebody
reversed that and eliminated that economic law?
....
Paul: Why do central banks hold it, if it’s not money?
Bernanke: Well, it’s a form of reserves.
Paul: Why don’t they hold diamonds?
Bernanke: Well it’s tradition—long-term tradition.60
With this disorder as a backdrop, this Part attempts to analyze the
threats—to economies, markets, governments, regulators, policymakers,
investors, and speculators—associated with the advent of new and highly
volatile forms of exchange mediums, of which Bitcoin currently represents
the most visible.61
A. Background and History
1. Real, Virtual, and Fiat Currencies; Commodities; Money; and Inflation
In the mid-1970s, Friedrich von Hayek, an economics Nobel laureate,
stated “[t]here is no reason to doubt that private enterprise would, if
permitted, have been capable of providing as good and at least as trustworthy coins,”62 as those imposed by government monopoly63 on money.64 Hayek continued:
60

Monetary Policy and the State of the Economy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 46 (2011) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2
NJnL10vZ1Y (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
61
Rhys Bollen, The Legal Status of Online Currencies: Are Bitcoins the Future?, 24
J. BANKING & FIN. L. & PRACTICE 272, 272 (2013).
62
HAYEK, supra note 57, at 30; see also Robin Teigland, Zeynep Yetis, & Tomas
Larsson, Breaking Out of the Bank in Europe: Exploring Collective Emergent Institutional
Entrepreneurship through Bitcoin 2–3 (SNEE Conference 2013, Working Paper, 2013),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2263707&download=yes
(indicating that the Bitcoin community’s theoretical roots lay in the Hayekian Austrian School
of economics, potentially threatening large financial institutions and global governments).
63
Governmental regulatory enforcement mechanisms of monopolistic monetary
policies have ranged apparently from China and France employing the death penalty to
U.S. colonies treating repudiation of Continental notes as an enemy act. See, e.g.,
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If the public understood what price in ... inflation and instability it
pays for the convenience of having to deal with only one kind of
money in ordinary transactions, and not have to ... contemplate the
advantage of using money than the familiar kind, it would probably
find it very excessive .... [yet] we know that there are all kinds of other possible sorts of money, not least paper, which government is even
less competent to handle and even more prone to abuse than paper
money.65

First, a currency has traditionally represented a government monopoly’s legal tender.66 When the basis of currency pricing relies on something besides that government’s precious metal reserves, that currency
becomes known as a “‘fiat currenc[y]’ [, which] ha[s] value simply because their backing governments identified the currency as ‘legal tender.’”67 By printing or creating additional fiat currency units over time,
the currency supply relative to its demand generally increases, thus “reARTHUR NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN LAW, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 53 (Found. Press
1950); see also HAYEK, supra note 57, at 28 (stating “[g]overnments have at all times
[preceding the 6th century B.C.E., he notes] had a strong interest in persuading the public
that the right to issue money belongs exclusively to them.”); see also id. at 30–31
(indicating, “[t]he significance of the gradual appearance of government paper money [as
opposed to solid coinage minted from government-owned metal reserves], and soon of bank
notes, is for our purposes complicated” by using paper claims on metal issued by
government monopoly due to the use of paper claims. Hayek continued, “because for a long
time the problem was not the appearance of new kinds of money with a different
denomination [i.e., face amount], but the use as money of paper claims on the established
kind of metallic money issued by government monopoly[,]” thereby shifting government’s
role from minter of stored metal to coinage to a backer of paper money by reserves of that
metal to determining how much paper money may be printed, regardless of any metallic
backing [called fiat money]. This series of events prompted Hayek to assert that
“governments have become wholly inadequate for the task and, it can be said without
qualifications, have incessantly and everywhere abused their trust to defraud the people.”
(emphasis added)). Cf. Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital
Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 182, 187 (2012) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; United States v. Gellman, 44 F. Supp. 360, 365–66 (D. Minn. 1942)) (asserting that
“[t]he Constitution has nothing to say about private parties creating money.... For example
in United States v. Gellman, the court warned that early money-related laws providing
criminal penalties should be cautiously applied to new technologies.”).
64
See Bollen, supra note 61, at 272 (claiming that “[m]oney, payment and currency are
simply social constructs. What people are willing to treat as payment are payments, same as
money.”). Cf. OKLA. ST. ANN. Tit. 12A, § 1-201(24) (West 2013) (defining “money” as a
“medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government and
includes a monetary unit of account established by an intergovernmental organization or by
agreement between two or more countries”).
65
HAYEK, supra note 57, at 28.
66
See HAYEK supra note 57, at 56, 58 (Hayek’s definition of currency).
67
Grinberg, supra note 63, at 173.
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duc[ing] the value of the [previously existing] currency,” which “correspondingly increases [the] prices” of that economy’s goods and services,
resulting in the classic definition of inflation.68 As a result, people who
fear inflation—which was a major cause of Hitler’s ascent to power in
post–World War I Germany69—are prone to distrust fiat currencies and the
governmental central banks70 that can cause inflation by printing additional units of its monopolistic currency, eviscerating the purchasing power of
its society.
Second, given that the Director of the CFTC used the film Trading
Places to explain commodities to congress, perhaps the best definition of
commodities comes from the Trading Places scene.71
Third, as economics Professor L. Randall Wray stated, “[d]efining
money,” regardless of its form, “is a continually vexing problem for
monetary theorists,” in which two general approaches exist: (1) “defining
money by its functions (the textbook approach)” and (2) “choosing [arbitrarily] some empirical definition (as Keynes did) ....”72 Simply put, an
arbitrary exchange, such as money, is traditionally associated with three
functions: medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value.73
68

Id. Inflation acts like a tax and is the result of a reduction in a currency’s
purchasing power. See EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & JOEL F. HOUSTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 184, 191, 283 (Cengage Learning, 13th ed. 2013).
69
See, e.g., HENRY ASHBY TURNER, JR., HITLER’S THIRTY DAYS TO POWER: JANUARY
1933 2–3 (Basic Books 1996) (indicating that following the First World War, Germany
suffered “a hyperinflation that destroyed the currency ....”); Melchior Palyi, Economic
Foundations of the German Totalitarian State, 46 AM. J. SOC. 469, 469 (1991)
(employing an “economic versus ideological interpretation of Nazism” to assert that
“[t]he inflation of the early 1920’s delivered a moral [sic] blow at democracy as a form of
government which shook the nation’s political loyalty by undermining its reliance upon
security based on ‘saving’ .... [i]n their ‘despair’ a large sector of the German people
were willing to follow Hitler ....”).
70
See Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers, Central Bank Independence and
Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT, &
BANKING 151, 154 (1993) (comparing the relative independence among central banks
globally).
71
See supra note 58.
72
See Professor L. Randall Wray, Workshop Presentation at the Centre of Full
Employment and Equity: Understanding Modern Money (Dec. 10 & 11, 2001) (citing
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY 167 (Harcourt-Brace-Jovanovich
1964)). Professor Wray also states that “a system based on a commodity money is not a
‘money economy’ as Keynes defined it. Rather, the commodity money is an (imagined)
economy in which money serves as nothing more than a numeraire ....” Id. at 5. See also
L. RANDALL WRAY, UNDERSTANDING MONEY: THE KEY TO FULL EMPLOYMENT AND
PRICE STABILITY (Edward Elgar Publ’g 2006).
73
See Virtual Currency Schemes, EUR. CENT. BANK 1, 10 (Oct. 2012), http://www.ecb.e
uropa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf [hereinafter ECB Report].
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Regardless of whether one views the U.S. dollar as currency, a commodity, or a unit of money, it remains a fiat medium of exchange since the
separation from the gold standard in the early 1970s, leaving the U.S. dollar open to unlimited issuance by a central bank and inflationary pressures.
But “[u]nlike fiat currencies, whose value is derived through regulation or
law and underwritten by the state,”74 virtual currencies are different for
various reasons explored in the next section.
2. Crypto Currencies, Virtual Currencies, and Other Appellations
Several authors refer to cryptocurrencies,75 which represent an idea existing since at least the mid-1980s.76 One of the first cryptocurrencies,
known as “DigiCash,” started in the early 1990s by an individual who
“obtained ... digital currency patents in the 1980s related to ensuring anonymity using cryptography.”77 Although DigiCash failed,78 the idea of an
anonymous and cryptographic currency developed over the course of the
1990s through the cypherpunk e-mail list that allegedly included individuals who “advocated the use of cryptography ... for the protection of private
individuals, against each other and against the government.”79
While one may scoff at the idea of a cryptocurrency or a cypherpunk email group, the group’s members included currently relevant newsmakers,
such as Julian Assange, known for his whistleblowing activities as the founder of WikiLeaks.80 Some authors describe the cypherpunks as an e-mail list
74

Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the
Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 115 (2012).
75
See, e.g., William J. Luther & Josiah Olson, Bitcoin is Memory passim (Inst. For
Human Studies at Geo. Mason Univ., Working Paper, 2013), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2275730; William J. Luther, Cryptocurrencies,
Network Effects, and Switching Costs (Mercatus Ctr., Geo. Mason Univ., Working Paper,
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2295134; Sarah Jeong,
The Bitcoin Protocol as Law, and the Politics of a Stateless Currency (Working Paper, 2013),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294124.
76
Grinberg, supra note 63, at 169 n.46; Jeong, supra note 75, at 9.
77
Grinberg, supra note 63, at 169 n.46.
78
Id.
79
Jeong, supra note 75, at 9.
80
Id. Cf. Rainey Reitman, a Director at the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), an
organization co-founded by former Cypherpunk John Gilmore, engaged in Bitcoin
transactions but ceased doing so in 2011. She is also a co-founder of the Bradley Manning
Support Network (supporting WikiLeaks whistleblower Pfc. Bradley Manning), and
additionally supports Bitcoin as a method to provide needed anonymity to financially support
patriotic causes such as whistleblowing on one’s government. About-Rainey Reitman,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/about/staff/rainey-reitman (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014); Rainey Reitman, Bitcoin – a Step Toward Censorship-Resistant
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with libertarian streaks, opposing most regulation, advocating for privacy,
and seeking to use cryptography.81 Toward the end of the decade, in 1998,
pseudonymously named Wei Dai, created the idea of b-money.82 B-money
foreshadowed the allegedly pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto, author of
the paper83 detailing the creation of the Bitcoin currency84 that appeared
just as the U.S. and global economies and currencies began to plummet in
2008–2009.85 Nakamoto’s germinal paper set the foundation for the purpose of “cryptographic proof,” which was to purportedly serve as a “solution to…double spending” and described the creation of blocks, chains (or
“blockchains”), and Bitcoins that go well beyond this Article’s scope.86
Because cryptography is a key to Bitcoin’s success, many refer to virtual
currencies as a cryptocurrency, while others, including government agencies, refer to virtual currencies as an e-currency,87 digital currency,88 virtual currency,89 or a decentralized convertible virtual currency.90
At least a dozen virtual currencies exist as of this writing.91 Those include: (1) Litecoin (LTC) (called a “complementary cryptocurrency— ‘the
silver to Bitcoin’s gold,’”), which as of May 11th, 2013, had approximately
Digital Currency, EFF DEEPLINKS BLOG (Jan. 20, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks
/2011/01/bitcoin-st ep-toward-censorship-resistant.
81
Grinberg, supra note 63, at 162.
82
Wei Dai, b-money, WEI DAI’S HOME PAGE, http://weidai.com/bmoney.txt.
83
See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2009),
http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. On March 6, 2014, Newsweek allegedly revealed the face
behind bitcoin. Leah McGrath Goodman, The Face Behind Bitcoin, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6,
2014), available at http://mag.newsweek.com/2014/03/14/bitcoin-satoshi-nakamoto.html.
84
See Grinberg, supra note 63, at 162; Nakamoto, supra note 83.
85
Jeong, supra note 75, at 12–13 (citation omitted) (indicating that while Satoshi
never mentioned the cypherpunks or crypto anarchy on any Internet postings, “[i]nstead,
Bitcoin was introduced to the world in the context of the 2008 financial crisis” as “an
alternative to a system controlled by ‘financial institutions’”).
86
Nakamoto, supra note 83.
87
FinCEN Guidance FIN-2013-G001, supra note 15, at 3.
88
Nicholas A. Plassaras, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin Within the
Reach of the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INTL L. 377 (2013); Kaplanov, supra note 74. Both articles
refer to Bitcoins as a “private digital currency.”
89
Memorandum from Benjamin M. Lawsky on Notice of Inquiry on Virtual Currencies
to N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Services (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/pr
ess2013/memo1308121.pdf; Kelly Clay, Amazon Announces New Virtual Currency for
Kindle Fire, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyclay/2013/02/05/a
mazon-announces-new-virtual-currency-for-kindle-fire/.
90
FinCEN Guidance FIN-2013-G001, supra note 15, at 3.
91
Andrew R. Johnson, From Bitcoin to Amazon Coins: A Guide to Virtual
Currencies, WALL ST. J. (May 31, 2013, 6:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013
/05/31/from-bitcoin-to-amazon-coins-a-guide-to-virtual-currencies/.
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17 million LTC in circulation92 with a market price of $3.28 USD per LTC,
for an aggregate market price of approximately $55.5 million USD, “making it the most valuable cryptocurrency after Bitcoin;”93 (2) PPCoin
(PPC), that purportedly has an additional security feature called “proof-ofstake”94 but also represents a centralized virtual currency without an alleged cap on the number of PPC that could be created, thus more reflective
of mainstream fiat currencies but less attractive to many founders and early adopters of Bitcoins; other competing virtual currencies exist such as (3)
Freicoin (FRC), (4) Namecoin, (5) Terracoin, (6) Ripple, and (7) Feathercoin, among others.95 Numerous other virtual currencies have failed, including Solidcoin, BBQCoin, Fairbrix, and GeistGold.96 Global e-commerce
powerhouse Amazon entered the virtual currency arena in May 2013 with
Amazon Coins, primarily to buy “apps, games, and in-app items.”97 This
Article focuses on Bitcoins because Bitcoins currently represent the
“world’s most widely used alternative currency,”98 and they have been
that way since January 9, 2009 when Nakamoto announced via email the
“first release of Bitcoin,”99 and the creation of the initial Bitcoin “block”
(the “Genesis Block”)100 occurred.
B. Specifically, What Are Bitcoins, and How Do They Function?
Bitcoin is an electronic payment system “that uses peer-to-peer networking along with digital signatures and cryptographics to generate currency.”101 Bitcoins represent “a private digital currency traded online via a
92

Ian Steadman, Wary of Bitcoin? A Guide to Some Other Cyptocurrencies,
ARSTECHNICA (May 11, 2013, 9:51 AM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2013/05/wary-of-b
itcoin-a-guide-to-some-other-cryptocurrencies/.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Johnson, supra note 91.
96
Steadman, supra note 92.
97
Press Release, Amazon, Introducing Amazon Coins (Feb. 5, 2013), available at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1781498&highl
ight= (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
98
Justin Spittler, Bitcoin: Money of the Future or Fool’s Gold, WALL ST. CHEATSHEET
(June 2, 2013), http://wallstcheatsheet.com/stocks/bitcoin-money-of-the-future-or-fools-gol
d.html/?a=viewall.
99
Email from Satoshi Nakamoto (Jan. 9, 2009, 5:05 PM), available at http://www.mailar
chive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg10142.html [hereinafter Nakamoto email].
100
Joel Falconer, Bitcoin, the Peer-To-Peer Currency that Hopes to Change the World,
TNW (June 5, 2011 8:30 AM), http://thenextweb.com/insider/2011/06/05/bitcoin-the-peer-t
o-peer-currency-that-hopes-to-change-the-world/.
101
Duncan Elms, A Brief Background on Bitcoin, DIGITAL FOR REAL LIFE (Apr. 23,
2013), http://www.digitalforreallife.com/2013/04/bitcoin/.

512

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:489

peer-to-peer network.”102 Given the minarchist-libertarian milieu painted
by many authors of virtual currency supporters, some authors believe that
Bitcoins have several endearing features to this constituency. Four key
distinctions exist between Bitcoins and fiat currencies.
First, unlike fiat currencies, the Bitcoin system is alleged to have “a
cap on the number of coins that will ever be generated”103 at 21 million
Bitcoins,104 unlike the central bankers who can print money at will. As a
result, “[m]any Bitcoin users are motivated by a belief that Bitcoin, unlike
the dollar, is inflation-resistant ....”105 Second, hearkening to the days of
precious metal-backed currencies, to distinguish them from fiat currencies,
Bitcoins’ creation and distribution to the market occurs via computer
“mining,” a model akin to “natural resource extraction, gold mining ....”106
Specifically, computer users can mine Bitcoins via computer processing,
which may force material overhead costs for users to produce Bitcoins.107
Therefore, Bitcoins are “likely to be attractive to those who like goldbacked currencies because its value depends on the availability of a limited (albeit virtual) resource rather than discretionary actions by central
bankers.”108 Third, the Bitcoin Foundation has maintained that, instead of
the currency’s backing by nothing, which is the case with fiat currencies,
or by a precious metal such as gold, which was the case with traditional
pre-Bretton Woods collapse currencies: “Bitcoin is backed exclusively by
code .... Cryptography is the key to Bitcoin’s success.”109 Fourth, Bitcoins
permit “two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the
102

Plassaras, supra note 88, at 2.
Falconer, supra note 100.
104
Id. Tom Standage, The Economist Explains: How Does Bitcoin Work, ECONOMIST
(Apr. 11, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04
/economist-explains-how-does-bitcoin-work.
105
Grinberg, supra note 63, at 198.
106
James Niccolai, Bitcoin Developer Chats About Regulation, Open Source, and the
Elusive Satoshi Nakamoto, PCWORLD (May 19, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.pcworld
.com/article/2039184/bitcoin-developer-talks-regulation-open-source-and-the-elusive-sat
oshi-nakamoto.html.
107
See Emma Rowley, Russians Most Interested in Bitcoin, Searches Show,
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 6, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/99
76524/Russians-most-interested-in-Bitcoin-searches-show.html.
108
Grinberg, supra note 63, at 168; see also Virtual Currencies: Mining Digital Gold,
ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 2013, 2:18 PM), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-econo
mics/21576149-even-if-it-crashes-bitcoin-may-make-dent-financial-world-mining-digital
(stating, “[w]hat makes Bitcoin different is that, unlike other online (and offline) currencies, it
is neither created nor administered by a single authority such as a central bank.”). Cf. Turner,
supra note 69 (describing the role of central bankers in fiat currencies and inflation).
109
About Bitcoin, BITCOIN FOUNDATION, http://bitcoinfoundation.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (emphasis added).
103
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need for a trusted third-party” or intermediary (or central issuer or payment
system), where the basis of the transaction’s security is “cryptographic proof
instead of trust.”110
Despite the legitimate concern that these facts may cause for users of
more traditional payment systems, currencies, commodities, money, and
marketplaces, Bitcoins currently are exchangeable for at least thirty statesanctioned currencies, including the Euro, Japanese Yen, Hong Kong Dollar,
and the U.S. dollar via exchanges such as Mt.Gox.111 From a disruptive
business model standpoint, Bitcoins may become a welcomed entrepreneurial innovator in the micropayment (payments under $1 USD) space, by competing with more well-known brands such as PayPal or iTunes112 based on a
perception of “low transaction costs” involved with BitCoin-based transactions.113 Even Boston University Distinguished Professor of Economics,
Lawrence Kotlikoff,114 recently went so far as to suggest that Bitcoins
should replace the dollar as the U.S. currency.115
110

Steadman, supra note 92; see also Plassaras, supra note 88, at 6.
Teigland, Yetis, & Larsson, supra note 62, at 7. Based in Japan, Mt.Gox was the
most widely used exchange as of this study period, with approximately 400,000
transactions in U.S. dollars alone on a daily basis. Id. However, Mt. Gox filed for
bankruptcy in early 2014 following several scandals. See, e.g., Andrew Peterson,
Everything You Need to Know About the Latest Bitcoin Crisis, WASH. POST (Feb. 25,
2014 1:48 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/02/25/everyt
hing-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-bitcoin-crisis/. Trading Bitcoins has become
increasingly popular, and according to some unsubstantiated websites, has “surpass[ed]
almost every financial asset over the past year, beating stock, gold, silver” and more.
Forexminute Bitcoin Trading, FOREXMINUTE, http://www.forexminute.com/trade-bit
coins (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). As of December 2012, the busiest Bitcoin exchange
was Mt.Gox, handling approximately eighty percent of Bitcoin-dollar trades. Terms of
Use, MT.GOX, https://mtgox.com/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). To use Mt.Gox purchasers
and sellers are charged a commission on every transaction. MT.GOX, https://mtgox.com
/terms_of_service (last visited, Feb. 24, 2014). Mt.Gox also charges to convert transactions
at a “fixed commission of 2.5%.” Id.
112
Other examples of micropayments include Facebook Credits, which was the currency
used for games such as Farmville that generated a thirty percent commission for Facebook
for all purchases made with Facebook credits. While Facebook credits became a failed
currency experiment, other potentially competitive microcurrencies including gaming-related
virtual currencies continue, and in May 2013, Amazon released “Amazon Coins” as a virtual
currency to purchase apps and games. See Grinberg, supra note 63, at 171; Kelly Clay,
Amazon Announces New Virtual Currency for Kindle Fire, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2013, 2:04 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyclay/2013/02/05/amazon-announces-new-virtual-currenc
y-for-kindle-fire/.
113
Grinberg, supra note 63, at 170.
114
Laurence Kotlikoff, BOS. UNIV. PUB. REL., http://www.bu.edu/news/profiles/laur
ence-kot likoff/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
115
Paul Solman, It’s No Bubble: Why We Should All Give Bitcoin a Chance, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Dec. 4, 2013, 12:13 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/its-n
o-bubble-why-we-should-al/.
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Further legitimizing Bitcoins is the meaningfully growing number of
small businesses and online enterprises that have already begun accepting
Bitcoin as an exchange medium—particularly as an alternative to credit and
debit cards.116 In May 2010, Laszlo Hanyecz “sen[t] 10,000 [B]itcoins to a
volunteer in the U.K.” who in exchange placed a call and had Papa John’s
Pizza deliver a pizza to Laszlo making this the first ever Bitcoin transaction.117 Further illustrating this point, several National Public Radio reporters
exchanged their Bitcoins to transact with a New York City deli,118 a Southern California car dealer accepts BitCoins as consideration for automobiles,119 and a Las Vegas housing developer also accepts BitCoins.120 If virtual currencies continue this momentum and become widely accepted, a
substitution effect could occur, contrary to the desire of central bankers,
which may explain the mid-August 2013 actions by Congress121 and New
York’s Department of Financial Services,122 both demanding granular investigations of a currency that has existed for more than four years.
To adherents of the Hayekian–Austrian–minarchist–libertarian view,123
the government’s real concern and involvement in this matter likely results
from governmental realization that increased Bitcoin use should result in decreased “real” currency (legal tender) use, thus hampering central bankers’

116

Sarah E. Needleman, More Small Businesses Embrace Bitcoin, WALL ST. J. (June
26, 2013, 7:27 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873233000045
7855994138913138.
117
Curt Hopkins, The Complete History of Bitcoin—The Revolutionary Currency, DAILY
DOT (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.dailydot.com/business/bitcoin-complete-history-timeline/.
118
The Tuesday Podcast: Bitcoin, NPR PLANET MONEY (June 12, 2011, 6:44 PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/07/13/137795648/the-tuesday-podcasst-bitcoin.
119
We Just Sold Our Very First Vehicle with Bitcoin as Payment!, LAMBORGHINI
NEWPORT BEACH (Dec. 4, 2013), http://lamborghininewportbeach.blogspot.com/2013/12
/we-just-sold-our-very-first-vehicle.html; Melanie Hicken, Someone Bought a $100,000
Tesla with Bitcoins, CNN MONEY (Dec. 12, 2013, 11:49 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013
/12/06/autos/tesla-bitcoin/index.html.
120
Jennifer Robison, Home for sale: Asking $7.85 million, bitcoin welcome, LAS
VEGAS REV. J. (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/home-sale-askin
g-785-million-bitcoin-welcome.
121
See Zachary Warmbrodt, Congress Starts Looking into Bitcoin, POLITICO (Aug.
13, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/congress-starts-looking-in
to-bitcoin-95464.html.
122
See Timothy B. Lee, Congress Starts Investigating Bitcoin, WASH. POST (Aug. 13,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/13/congress-starts-i
nvestigating-bitcoin/; Lawsky, supra note 89.
123
Reuters not so kindly phrased Bitcoins users as “an odd assortment of uber-geeks,
anarchists, libertarians, scammers, and forex [foreign exchange] traders.” Naomi O’Leary,
Bitcoin, the City Traders’ Anarchic New Toy, REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2012, 7:01 PM), http://ww
w.reuters.com/article/2012/04/01/traders-bitcoin-idUSL6E8ET5K620120401.
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attempts to influence short-term interest rates.124 Such concern becomes
particularly heightened during an era of massive government involvement
favoring large financial institutions over middle class borrowers’ credit
constraints, via three rounds of failed Federal Reserve quantitative easing.125 As a result, more than just e-businesses and delis want to be involved
in virtual currencies; “[i]f the virtual currency seems to be taking off ... the
banks want to be part of that.”126 It has been reported that Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley employees have “visit[ed] online Bitcoin exchanges as
often as 30 times a day”127 and rumors exist that large U.S. financial institutions are among the virtual currency investors.128 If Bitcoin represented a
legitimate threat to legal tender, these financial institutions may be less likely to feed from the government trough. Perhaps that explains why, in late

124

ECB Report, supra note 73, at 34. Central bankers can only impact the short term
interest rates, that is, the short-end of the yield curve, which caused former Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan to remark that his influence over short-term rates
having no effect on intermediate interest rates was a “conundrum,” or, to many financial
journalists a “riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,” to quote Winston Churchill.
Roger Craine & Vance L. Martin, Interest Rate Conundrum, B.E. J. MACROECON., Mar.
2009, available at http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejm.2009.9.1/bejm.2009.9.1.1819/be
jm.2009.9.1.1819.xml?format=INT; Mark Glibert, Greenspan’s Bond Conundrum Ripens
Into an Enigma: Mark Gilbert, BLOOMBERG (June 2, 2005), http://www.bloomberg.com
/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=columnist_gilbert&sid=ac6xHdHdneGo; Philip Coggan,
Greenspan’s Conundrum: A Riddle in a Mystery in an Enigma, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005.
Central bankers’ control over interest rates and the money supply are so meaningful,
because the interest rates serve in essence as the denominator for determining the present
value of every global asset.
125
See Ben S. Bernake, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Stamp Lecture London School of Economics: The Crisis and the Policy
Response (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech
/bernanke20090113a.htm; James D. Hamilton & Jing Cynthia Wu, Effectiveness of
Alternative Monetary Policy Tools in a Zero Lower Bound Environment 37–38, 44–46
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 16956, 2011), http://www.nber.org
/papers/w16956.pdf?new_window=1; Johathan H. Wright, What Does Monetary Policy Do
to Long-Term Interest Rates at the Zero Lower Bound? 1, 8–9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper 17154, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17154.pdf.
126
Andrew R. Johnson, Promise and Peril of Virtual Currencies, WALL ST. J. (May
28, 5:33 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324125504578511
\580913892620 (quoting Mercedes Kelley Tunstall) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127
O’Leary, supra note 123.
128
Id. (indicating that none of Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, or Morgan Stanley would
respond to inquiries of whether they owned Bitcoins); Kamal El-Din, Goldman Sachs Shares
Surge on Announcement of Bitcoin Trading Unit, UNCONFIRMED SOURCES, http://
unconfirmedsources.com/?itemid=6155 (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (indicating that
Goldman Sachs’ shares rose on unsubstantiated rumors that Goldman was launching a
Bitcoin trading desk).
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July 2013, the SEC quietly charged an individual with violating federal
securities laws with an alleged Bitcoin-related scheme.129
Also, many individuals on the other side of the political continuum—
or Nolan chart—believe “Bitcoin is not going to fly because there is no
central bank or power base. It’s doomed to fail.”130 The ECB noted, “[t]he
fact that the founder of Bitcoin uses a pseudonym—Satoshi Nakamoto—
and is surrounded by mystery does nothing to help promote transparency
and credibility in the scheme.”131 A 2012 ECB Report indicated the price
and volatility of virtual currencies depended on four material factors:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Money supply and issuer actions, regarding market intervention to maintain
a fixed or semi-fixed exchange rate;
Institutional conditions governing the virtual community;
The virtual currency issuer’s reputation for meeting commitments; and
A currency’s future value speculations and any history of cyber-attacks suffered in the virtual community.132

In addition to being affected by “credit, liquidity, and operational risk
without any kind of underlying legal framework, [virtual currencies] are
also subject to legal uncertainty and fraud risk....”133 Liberal economics
129

Complaint ¶¶ 6–7, SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex.
July 23, 2013) (No. 4:13CV00415) (claiming jurisdiction under §§ 20 and 22 Securities Act
[15 U.S.C. §§ 77t and 77v] and §§ 21 and 27 Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u and 78aa]).
130
O’Leary, supra note 123 (quoting Simon Lelieveldt).
131
ECB Report, supra note 73, at 27.
132
Id. at 38.
133
Id. at 17. Cf. Quantitative Easing 1, 2, 3 and other Federal Reserve actions that impact
interest rates and lead to the devaluation of traditional U.S. currency. See, e.g., Peter Schiff,
Fed Is Killing the Recovery with Quantitative Easing, FORBES (Sept. 4, 2012, 4:36 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/09/04/fed-is-killing-the-recovery-wit
h-quantitative-easing/. Schiff subscribes to the Austrian economic analytic and has been
recognized as one of twelve public figures to predict accurately the housing bubble and
its crash. See Dirk J. Bezemer, “No One Saw This Coming”: Understanding Financial
Crisis Through Accounting Models, MUNICH PERS. REPEC ARCHIVE PAPER NO. 15892
(June 2009); Tim Swanson, Interview with Peter Schiff, MISES ECON. BLOG (Apr. 21,
2008), http://archive.mises.org/8039/interview-with-peter-schiff/; Leslie Wines, CDOs
Would Be Rocked by Open Auction: Strategist, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2007, 2:27 PM), http:/
/www.marketwatch.com/story/bear-stearns-hedge-fund-woes-stir-worry-in-cdo-market;
MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, AMERICA’S GREAT DEPRESSION 7–12 (2011) (1962) (employing
an Austrian/Misesan analytic in the 1960s to explain why a policy such as Quantitative
Easing would not work). Having said that, other notable heterodox economists also
indicated that a bubble formed and would burst. See generally Dean Baker, The Run-Up
in Home Prices: Is It Real or Is It Another Bubble?, (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Research
Briefing Paper, Aug 2002), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/housing_200
2_08.pdf (representing a post-Keynsian analytic); Nick Beams, US Housing Crisis Could
Spark Serious Economic Downturn, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Sept. 3, 2007),
http://www .wsws.org/en/articles/2007/09/econ-s03.html (representing a Marxian view).
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Nobel laureate Paul Krugman previously indicated in scholarly writings that
currency crises occur as a result of speculative attacks likely resulting from a
risk combination of international reserve losses, current account deficits, fiscal and monetary expansions, and decreased price competitiveness.134
C. Bubbles, Bitcoins, the Wild West, or Holland?
1. Is Bitcoin a Fad, a Bubble, or Something Else?
In late 2012, singer Alicia Keys introduced a song entitled Girl is on Fire,
at the MTV Video Music Awards that subsequently hit number 5 on the
charts.135 Evidencing Bitcoins’ impact on popular culture, within several
months, a YouTube video parodied Ms. Keys’s song to belittle Bitcoin’s status as a bubble,136 as demonstrated in the below chart.
She’s just a girl
Bitcoin’s a fad
And she’s on fire.
And it’s on fire.
Hotter than a fantasy.
Higher than a fantasy
Lonely like a highway.
Like a singularity.
She’s living in a world, and it’s
Bulls living in world full of
on fire.
denial.
Filled with catastrophe,
I’m feeling a catastrophe.
But she knows she can fly away.
They’re thinking it can fly
Ohhhh, she got both feet on the
away.
Ohhh, I keep on riding my ground.
And she’s burning it down.
bear.
Ohhhh, she got her head in the
Though I’m falling a tear.
Ohhh, it’s gonna crash to the clouds.
And she’s not backing down.
ground.
This girl is on fire.
And I’m not backing down.
This girl is on fire.
Bitcoin is a Bubble.
Bitcoin is a Bubble, ohh.
She’s walking on fire.
This girl is on fire.137
It’s only a Bubble.
Bitcoin is a Bubble, ohh.
134

See Paul Krugman, A Model of Balance of Payments Crises, 11 J. MONEY, CREDIT
& BANKING 311, 312 (1979); Paul Krugman & J. Rotemberg, Speculative Attacks on
Target Zones, in TARGET ZONES AND CURRENCY BANDS 117 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1991).
135
ALICIA KEYS, Girl Is on Fire, on GIRL ON FIRE (RCA Records 2012); see Alicia
Keys Chart History, BILLBOARD, available at http://www.billboard.com/artist/278600/Ali
cia+Keys/chart?f=381 (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
136
TheKoziTwo, “The Proundhon Song (Bitcoin Is a Bubble),” YOUTUBE (Apr. 7,
2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A7TuFy0fcuw.
137
Compare KEYS, supra note 135, with TheKoziTwo, supra note 136.
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Gradually dispensing Bitcoins into the market is alleged to create more
stability as opposed to “releas[ing] all 21 million Bitcoins at once,” which
would be “more volatile.”138 In the beginning, to generate Bitcoins it was
“ridiculously easy,” and a user could generate Bitcoins by using a “typical
PC” that would only take “just a few hours.”139 As more and more people
start generating Bitcoins, the difficulty level to generate the Bitcoins will
increase.140 In addition, “[o]btaining the necessary computational power is
easy, if expensive.”141 Additionally, “[a]n individual would need to spend
around $600,000 (plus costs for supporting infrastructure) to control a majority of the processing power on the network.”142 A legitimate question
arises then: if the level is hard and the computing power to mine so expensive, why are hackers at schools such as the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (M.I.T.) not harnessing the vast computing power of that university to enrich themselves or the university?
2. Certain Risks Associated with Bitcoins
“Bitcoin might undergo a deflationary spiral that causes certain individuals or industries to abandon Bitcoin, possibly causing a panic or just a
permanent depression in Bitcoin’s value.”143 “The end result of such a spiral
is underemployed human capital and other means of production and destruction of wealth.”144 Thus, deflationary pressures may impact Bitcoins
more than traditional currencies.145 Those who favor a regulatory state have
asserted that “[b]ecause digital currencies like Bitcoin lack regulation or
public oversight, they are subject to credit, liquidity, and operational risks,
as well as risk of fraud.”146 Other risks exist as well.

138

Niccolai, supra note 106.
Nakamoto, supra note 99.
140
Id.
141
Grinberg, supra note 63, at 181.
142
Id. at 181 n.90.
143
Id. at 177–78.
144
Id. at 178.
145
ECB Report, supra note 73, at 25 (“If ... the number of Bitcoin users starts growing
exponentially for any reason, and assuming that the velocity of money does not increase
proportionally, a long-term appreciation of the currency can be expected... [meaning] a
deprecation of the prices of goods and services quoted in Bitcoins. People would have a
great incentive to hold Bitcoins and delay their consumption, thereby exacerbating the
deflationary spiral.”).
146
Plassaras, supra note 88, at 12.
139
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For example, evidence of computing risk has occurred, as “Bitcoin trojan horses already exist.”147 In addition, cyber-attacks have doubled from
2010 to 2012.148 Mt.Gox indicated that hackers have targeted the exchange
“to ‘destabilise Bitcoin’ ... [and] abuse the system for profit.”149 When
“Mt.[]Gox, the most popular exchange, was hacked .... [t]he glut of
bitcoins for sale crashed the price from $17.50 to $0.01 within a half
hour.”150 The company said, “Attackers ... wait for everybody to panic-sell
their Bitcoins, wait for the price to drop to a certain amount ... and start
buying as much as they can.”151 In late 2010, the Bitcoin system had to fix
a “vulnerability in the system” found when the creation of nearly 185 billion Bitcoins resulted from a verification error and again when an intergovernmental task force wrote that terrorist groups may use digital assets
such as Bitcoin.152
Such linkage to international criminal activity may represent a material
risk for Bitcoins, as well. In 2011, Silkroad, which was an illegal marketplace for crimes with victims, began permitting Bitcoins as a currency
medium.153 In 2012, more controversy arose: a major market, Tradehill,
closed;154 two additional markets—Bitcoinica and Bitfloor—were
hacked;155 an FBI report became leaked, reporting that the FBI “fears[ed] ...
Bitcoin as a tool to facilitate the sales of drugs and weapons and assist terrorists;”156 the closing of “Bitcoin savings and trust” creating “$5.6 million
in debt;”157 and clients sued Bitcoinica for the alleged loss of deposits.158 As
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“Wild West” 3 n.3 (Working Paper, 2013) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233374
(citing 2011 Second Annual Cost of Cyber Crime Study: Benchmark Study of U.S.
Companies, PONEMON INST. (Aug. 2011), http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/20
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a result, “users are anxious about Bitcoin’s legal status and the possibility
of a government crackdown.”159
Bitcoinica’s ultimate folding prompted a $460,000 lawsuit against
Bitcoinica, allegedly founded by 17-year-old Singaporian Zhou Tong,
whose platform permitted for shorting Bitcoins, and whose platform allegedly suffered from a cyber-attack in which hackers purportedly stole more
than 40,000 Bitcoins.160 One author described this situation as “a story that
will sound familiar to anyone who has been following the saga of the
fledgling currency and its nascent economy, a digital Wild West where
bad actors routinely take advantage of inexperienced buyers and sellers in
the absence of a sheriff.”161
Volatility risks exist, because “no fixed exchange rate between
Bitcoins and regular currencies” exists.162 In addition, other disruptive
risks, besides alternate virtual currencies, exist for Bitcoins, such as competing transaction logs. In March 2013, Mt.Gox had two separate transaction logs for a time and, while the competing logs lasted for only several
hours, the Mt.Gox exchange halted activity and Bitcoins’ price plummeted
from $48 to $37.163 Disruptions may also occur to the international
FOREX markets.164
Another recurring theme arises as to whether virtual currencies, such
as Bitcoins, represent a form of a Ponzi scheme. These claims arise because virtual currency holders initiate their holdings by purchasing
Bitcoins with traditional currencies; however, virtual currency holders
may only leave the scheme and retrieve their funds in traditional currencies if other interested parties want to buy the selling party’s virtual currency holdings (i.e., if other people join the scheme).165
3. Analyzing Arguable Madness of Crowds and Bitcoin Bubbles
One Bitcoin trader indicated that approximately nine of ten traders
were purchasing digital assets such as Bitcoin in hopes of capitalizing on
158

Adrianne Jeffries, Bitcoin Woes: Users File Lawsuit over $460k in Missing Funds,
THE VERGE (Aug. 10, 2012, 4:20 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2012/8/10/3233711/secon
d-bitcoin-lawsuit-is-filed-in-california.
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Grinberg, supra note 63, at 161. Cf. Dickson Lueng, Doing Business in China,
LEHMAN BROWN MGI MEDITERRANEAN CIRCLE MEETING 23 (Mar. 4, 2012), http://www
.soraya.co.il/files/wordocs/13314497215798.03.pdf.
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Jeffries, supra note 158.
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See, e.g., infra note 191 (quoting Douglas J. Whaley); O’Leary, supra note 123.
See also Jeffries, supra note 158.
162
Bollen, supra note 61, at 274.
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Id. at 278 (internal citation omitted).
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See generally, Plassaras, supra note 88.
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fast and material returns.166 Bitcoin has experienced hugely volatile market
pricing to date. For example, early on the currency reflected a near-trivial
market price.167 Specifically, in May 2010, a Bitcoin’s market price was
$0.005 until hitting $30 per Bitcoin in June 2011 (a 600,000 percent increase) prior to plummeting to $2 that October.168 By early 2013, Bitcoin’s
market price continued to demonstrate extreme volatility, causing concerns that the market is creating a “bubble.”169 Another author indicated:
The scale of the recent boom-and-bust has been staggering indeed. At the
start of the year, a Bitcoin was worth $13.51. Earlier this week, it traded as
high as $266. And on Thursday, it plummeted to less than $100, as one of
the exchanges where Bitcoins are traded closed temporarily.170

Evidencing this extreme volatility in the Bitcoin currency market is the
currency’s recent price movements in 2013. For example, during the fivemonth period from February 2013 to June 2013, Bitcoins’ market price
went from the $20 range to the $220 range, back to the $20 range, to the
$120 range as of early June 2013.171 Subsequently, the price was near
$1,200 on December 5, 2013 (nearly the extant market price of gold), prior to collapsing below $600 during the next 48 hours before rising to approximately $830 by the week ending December 6, 2013.172 In May 2013,
the Wall Street Journal indicated that the market price of Bitcoins “has
gone through some wild spikes in value this spring.”173 As of April 2013,
Bitcoins’ market price totaled approximately 1.6 billion U.S. dollars,
166

O’Leary, supra note 123 (quoting Simon Lelieveldt).
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Doesn’t Understand, BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 2013, 10:13 AM), http://www.businessinsider
.com/investing-in-bitcoin-2013-5.
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The Real Significance of the Bitcoin Boom (and Bust), TIME (Apr. 12, 2013), http://
business.time.com/2013/04/12/the-real-significance-of-the-bitcoin-boom-and-bust/.
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#rg730ztgSzm1g10zm2g25zv (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
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TIMES (Dec. 8, 2013, 7:28 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-the-bit
coin-crash-20131207,0,7011276.story#axzz2tJppAfln. Cf. Lawrence (Larry) Kotlikoff &
Rob Shavell, It’s No Bubble: Why We Should All Give Bitcoin a Chance, PBS NEWSHOUR
(Dec. 4, 2013, 12:13 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/its-no-bubble-why-we-s
hould-al/ (stating—via well-regarded economists—earlier that same week that Bitcoin was not
undergoing a bubble and that Bitcoins should replace the U.S. Dollar as that nation’s currency).
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Reed Albergotti & Jeffery Sparshott, U.S. Says Firm Laundered Billions, WALL
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which exceeded the FOREX price for “the entire currency stock of over 30
countries, including Niger, Belize, and Rwanda.”174
In a cyber-attack on June 20, 2011, the value of a Bitcoin dropped
“from USD 17.50 to USD 0.01 within minutes.”175 An ECB chart demonstrated how an “immature and illiquid currency can almost completely
disappear within minutes, causing panic to thousands of users.”176 Bitcoin
“daily transactions” have risen “from 1,000 in early 2011 to roughly
50,000 today.”177 As of February 2014 approximately 12,296,825 Bitcoins
were in circulation.178 This volatility and increase in trading volume has
led several authors to compare the Bitcoin situation to the tulip-bulb situation of the Dutch East India company.179
D. Legal, Regulatory, and Other Enforcement Mechanisms?
U.S. regulators are beginning to focus on Bitcoin, saying it “is for sure
something we need to explore,” according to Bart Chilton, one of five
commissioners from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.180 In
March 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department stated that all businesses which
engage in “the exchange or transfer of [Bitcoin] will be considered ‘money services businesses.’”181 The founder of Bitcoinstore.com, Roger Ver,
claimed to know that some entrepreneurs had relocated to Panama in order to
escape the reach of the American legal and regulatory system.182 Also,
“[e]ven if US regulations make it hard for Bitcoin businesses to operate in the

174
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bulb or dotcom stock bubble.”); Sivy, supra note 170 (comparing Bitcoins to the tulip
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(asserting that the tulip bulb could “hold[] important lessons for economists and
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US, that doesn’t mean it will make it difficult for people to use Bitcoin as a
currency in the US. Bitcoin is a world currency,” he told the Financial Times.183
A recent Reuters article stated that “Bitcoin poses a puzzle for [European] regulators”184 and “[t]he situation in the United States is even more
complex,”185 where a recent law review article indicated that “[m]ost importantly, Bitcoin currently operates in a legal grey area.”186 Some critics
have likened Bitcoin to a currency equivalent of PayPal for criminals,187 and
others—approximately 217,000 hits’ worth on a Google search in August
2013188—have called Bitcoin a “Wild West”189 type of finance. Senator
Charles Schumer of New York “declared [B]itcoin ‘an online form of money laundering used to disguise the source of money.’”190 Moreover, doctoral
candidate and Yale master’s degree holder in religion, Gabriel J. Michael
recently wrote, that “most actors in the virtual world operate under conditions of anarchy .... [and] [w]hen we fail to recognize the anarchic nature of
the virtual world, we come to fundamentally incorrect conclusions about
how best to think about that world.”191 Michael accused “legal scholars [of
being] far too sanguine about the ability of states to regulate the virtual
world,” because of Michael’s belief in “legal academia’s tendency to overemphasize legislation and formal rules, while underemphasizing other factors that influence actors’ behavior....”192 Despite Michael’s self-professed
expertise despite apparently lacking any educational degree in law or any
183
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“Bitcoin Wild West”; then follow search hyperlink) (Aug. 14, 2013, 7:05 PM) (on file
with author).
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See O’Leary, supra note 123; Jeffries, supra note 158; Gabriel J. Michael, Anarchy
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State and Ensure that the Virtual World Remains a “Wild West” 30 (George Washington
Univ., Working Paper, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233374.
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bar passage in any nation in the world, and while understanding that bubbles
can occur with or without government interference, the idea of a lawless
Wild West deserves exploration in this Article relative to potential regulatory solutions. This section details some potential regulatory problems in the
U.S., and a synthesized proscriptive proposal occurs below in Part IV.
Having said that, Bitcoin is not really run by anyone or anything as it is
not organized under a central authority;193 the absence of a central organizing body may render Bitcoin particularly difficult to shut down.194 Some
scholars have asserted that Bitcoins represent intangible private property
and reflect neither a contract nor debt owed among parties.195 This section
attempts to review potential regulatory instruments available in the U.S.,
relative to Bitcoins, that could attempt to prevent risk and bubbles.
Inquiries as to what statutory and regulatory schemes may apply to
Bitcoins appear to demonstrate that Bitcoins and virtual currencies generally
escape any material existing regimes. This section analyzes many, but certainly not all, of those potential schemes.
1. Anti-Counterfeiting Measures?
The U.S. Constitution assigns “control over currency to Congress to
the exclusion of states.”196 But, as one author indicated, “[t]he Constitution has nothing to say about private parties creating money.”197 In the recent Liberty Dollar private currency conviction, the Justice Department
asserted that creating private currency systems seemingly violates some
vague and non-specific federal law.198
Community currencies exist, however, including the more well-known
Ithaca Dollars, which “have avoided any legal attack under [counterfeiting
laws or the Stamp Payments] Act by creating notes only in values greater
than $1.”199 “[I]n United States v. Gellman, the [district] court warned that
early money-related laws providing criminal penalties should be cautiously
193
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are denominated in a temporal currency of hours, not a notional currency, such as dollars.
194

2014]

KICKSTARTER MY HEART

525

applied to new technologies.”200 But relative to counterfeiting, material
questions exist as to whether “[a]s a threshold matter, the statutes under
which NotHaus [Liberty Coin] was convicted, 18 U.S.C. §§ 485 and 486,
are inapplicable to Bitcoin because they only deal with metal coins or
coins or bars that resemble official U.S. or foreign currency.”201
2. Stamp Payments Act of 1862?
One author indicated that “[i]n the nineteenth century, inflation caused
the metal in ... coins to become more valuable than the face value of the
coins themselves .... Companies used privately issued currencies in the form
of notes or tokens in small denominations.”202 Attempting to prevent private currencies from arguably contributing to inflationary pressures,203
Congress enacted the Stamp Payments Act of 1862,204 of which Section 2
prohibits currencies with face values less than $1 to circulate, and whose
policy basis is to prohibit competition with the nation’s official currency.205
While some people believe that virtual currencies may be subject to the
Stamp Payments Act due to transactions occurring in digital assets or altcoins for $1 or under, legitimate questions of enforcement exist. Evidencing
the enforcement problem is that the Stamp Payments Act has not been addressed by the courts in a published opinion in over one hundred years.206
3. U.C.C. Article 4A and Electronic Funds Transfer Rules?
Unlike in the Uniform Commercial Code’s (U.C.C.’s) universe, no transparent issuer exists for a Bitcoin-based payment system.207 In addition, most
payment systems rely on common law, contractual underpinnings, legislation,
200
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and other codes to dictate the parties’ respective rights and obligations.208
Nonetheless, some researchers have argued that Bitcoin represents a payment
system, albeit one without express contracts or centralized rules.209
Article 4A of the U.C.C. defines a payment order as “an instruction of
a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted orally, electronically, or in writing, to pay, or to cause another bank to pay, a fixed or determinable
amount of money....”210 The U.C.C., however, limits the scope of its payment system through intermediary banks.211 As a result, it appears unlikely
that U.C.C. Article 4A applies to Bitcoins. When I spoke with noted
U.C.C. author Douglas J. Whaley—Professor Emeritus at The Ohio State
University Moritz College of Law—regarding how Bitcoins might fit into
a U.C.C. world, his response was that they do not and that the rules of the
so-called “Wild West” apply.212
Supporting the ideas that the rules of the “Wild West” apply to
Bitcoins, Kaplanov discussed a number of other current laws, rules, and
regulations that seemingly fail to encapsulate sufficient authority to permit
U.S. government regulation of alt-coins, crypto-currencies, or digital assets.213 These failures appear to include money transmitter licensing
laws,214 electronic funds transfer (EFT) laws and regulations,215 common
law contract law’s relation to legal tender,216 local currencies,217 sellers
208
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210
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attempting to use self-created coins similar in appearance to U.S. legal
tender, such as the Liberty Dollar,218 securities regulation,219 and commodities regulation.220 Kaplanov acknowledged, however, that some rules
governing foreign currency trading may ensnare Bitcoins.221
In addition, Bitcoins avoid many of the problems taught in commercial
paper and payment systems courses, because Bitcoins can generally “ensure
that the coin hasn’t been stolen, and that it hasn’t already been spent or
transferred to someone else.”222 In the event of a dispute with proper ownership in Bitcoins, the best and longest record prevails because of the peerto-peer networked approach; further, Bitcoin’s payment and transaction

Solomon, Reflections on the Future of Business Organizations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
1213, 1213–15, 1230 (1999). Solomon describes future trending privatization models for
traditionally perceived government-controlled practices such as quasi-currencies,
including vouchers, and asserting that “local currency helps promote a decentralized
political economy by discouraging the flow of capital to large, more environmentally
destructive business organizations,” id. at 215, and explains that:
[l]ocal currency involves the use of a medium of exchange other than
national currency to obtain goods and services. For example, simple
barter between individuals is a form of local currency. Other forms of
local currency seek to overcome the lack of flexibility inherent in a
traditional barter system which requires a direct swap of goods or
service between people.
One such system is the Ithaca HOURS system, which utilizes a paper
currency in which one HOUR has a value of ten dollars—the average
hourly wage in Ithaca, New York. Local businesses and individuals
wishing to participate in the Ithaca HOURS system need only agree to
accept the HOURS in full or partial exchange for goods and services.
Thus, by use of the Ithaca HOURS, participants in the program agree to
patronize local businesses which, in turn, reinforces trading among
people who live within the community. This program benefits
individuals, businesses, and the community.
Id. at 1230 (internal citations omitted).
218
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recording system is primarily maintained using cloud-based technology.223
While some people may initially scoff at a decentralized recordkeeping approach, such payment systems in many ways reflect smart cards.224
4. Commodities Statutes and Regulations Promulgated by the CFTC?
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulates derivatives contracts. Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),225 which was passed in 2010 to
“promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system”226 in response to the
subprime mortgage crisis and financial crisis of 2007–2010,227 the CFTC
has authority to oversee retail foreign exchange dealers. The CFTC’s jurisdiction does not extend to cash markets unless there are derivative contracts based on cash.228 Thus, Bitcoins generally should not be subject to
CFTC jurisdiction, but leveraged Bitcoin transactions settled in more than
two days—generally known as “rolling spot” transactions—appear to be
under the CFTC’s jurisdiction.229 Bart Chilton, a CFTC regulator, stated,
“[i]n essence, we’re talking about a type of shadow currency, and there is
more than a colorable argument to be made that derivative products relating to Bitcoin falls squarely within our jurisdiction.”230 Assuming that one
can take seriously a federal agency whose director pushed to pass the socalled “Eddie Murphy Rule,”231 a quick glance at the commodities rules
shows regulatory coverage of Bitcoin to be questionable. One author indicated that “[B]itcoin could also be classified as a commodity and its exchange a commodity futures contract. Commodities are goods sold in the

223
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market of uniform quality and value throughout the world.”232 However,
the CFTC retains exclusive jurisdiction over “accounts, agreements ..., and
transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery
... subject to regulation by the Commission.”233
But as discussed above234, challenges exist in stating with any reasonable certainty what constitutes a commodity. For example, the Court defined futures contracts as “agreements to buy or sell a specified quantity of
a commodity at a particular price for delivery at a set future date.”235 Thus,
a futures contract, which memorializes in the present a transaction to take
place in the future, is distinguishable from a forward contract, which has
been defined as “a contract for a present transaction with future delivery.”236 In addition, “the delivery of [B]itcoins between users is nearly instantaneous and well outside of the requirements for future delivery.”237
So while the CFTC may regulate a certain degree of commodities futures
contracts, and foreign currency contracts executed on a leveraged basis,238
little evidence supports the theory that Bitcoin transactions, even on a leveraged basis, would come under the purview of the CFTC.
5. Securities Laws?
Securities laws are described in greater detail in Part III dealing with
crowdfunding and Kickstarter, but the Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he fundamental purpose undergirding the Securities Acts is ‘to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market.’ ... Congress therefore did not attempt to precisely cabin the scope of the Securities Acts. Rather, it enacted a definition of ‘security’ sufficiently broad to
encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment.239

Therefore, it is critical that a determination is made as to whether Bitcoins
qualify as securities to be regulated under the Securities Acts. Some commentators have “concluded that digital currencies are unlikely to be regulated as
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See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 470 (1997).
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Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Erskine, 512 F.3d 309, 322 (6th Cir. 2008).
237
Kaplanov, supra note 74, at 147–48 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(C)(i)(II) (2010))
(stating in essence that delivery must be outside a three-day window to come under
CFTC regulatory authority).
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Presumably under 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(c)(2)(C)(i)(I) (West 2014).
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Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60–61 (1990) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
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securities,”240 and that should Bitcoins represent a security, it will be because
Bitcoins fall “within the vague and broad phrase ‘investment contract.’”241
This argument’s basis is that the Court in the famed Howey decision interpreted an investment contract as a security if four prongs were satisfied in
which a person “[1] invests his money in [2] a common enterprise and [3] is
led to expect profits [4] solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party
....”242 Thus, “[t]hose arguing that a [B]itcoin is not a security may also argue
that [B]itcoins … are commodities.”243
But “securities ... have a feature that commodities do not have: they
confer a claim on some other entity,”244 because “[a]ll securities represent claims against an issuer….”245 Yet,
decisions explaining why commodities are not securities have also
noted that commodities are “tangible” and have “inherent value,” unlike securities. Bitcoins are not “tangible,” and one may argue that by
design they have no inherent value because there is no government or
commodity backing them. Furthermore, just as one generally cannot
“use” a security—except by buying, selling, or pledging it—one cannot “use” a [B]itcoin—except by buying, selling, or pledging.246

As an author indicated, “although [B]itcoins share many features
with commodities, they also share features with securities and are unlikely to evade categorization as an ‘investment contract’ on this ground.”247
The OCC’s exemptions from the definition of “security” appear to save
Bitcoin from regulation, because Bitcoin is not a “note, draft, bill of exchange, or bankers acceptance….”248 Also, some authors have argued that
despite excluding currencies from the definition of securities, some currencies may also be securities, because currencies may be, not a “medium of

240

Id. at 195 (referencing Kerry Lynn Macintosh, How to Encourage Global
Electronic Commerce: The Case for Private Currencies On the Internet, 11 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 733, 746 n.49 (1998)).
241
Id. at 196.
242
Id. (citing SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946)).
243
Id. at 199.
244
Id.
245
RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY, & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE
LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 130 (Aspen Publisher, Inc., 4th ed.
2008). Cf. U.C.C. § 3-105(c) (defining “issuer” as relates to “instruments”).
246
Grinberg, supra note 63, at 200.
247
Id.
248
See 12 C.F.R. § 344.3(m)(5) (2014).
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exchange” but instead “current money.”249 Investors can engage in leveraged trading of or shorting Bitcoin.250
According to Tiegland, Yetis, and Larsson, the Bitcoin Foundation is
an approved 501(c)(3) entity by the Internal Revenue Service, with Nakamoto listed as a founding member, along with a five-person corporate
board.251 Corporate governance concerns are beyond this article’s scope,
but the foundation’s five board seats are voted by different voting classes,
based on annual membership classes based on costs, which are, of course,
denominated in Bitcoins.252 Corporate members of the Bitcoin Foundation
include Mt.Gox, bitcoinstore (U.S.), bitinstant (New York), CoinLab (Seattle), BITHOC (Florida), Cryptex (Kansas), the Newport Beach Company
(U.S.),253 zipbit (New Zealand), and eCardOne (Czech Republic).254
6. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956?
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956255 does not cover Bitcoins or
its exchanges as a banking institution. The Federal Reserve Board similarly
appears to lack authority.256 Many state banking laws also are similarly lacking, employing a hodgepodge of definitions regarding what constitutes a
bank.257 As The Economist indicated, “[u]nlike traditional currencies, which
are issued by central banks, Bitcoin has no central monetary authority.”258
In terms of banking regulation, the U.S. regulatory scheme for banks is
more fragmented than other G20 nations,259 thereby leaving a hodgepodge
of inconsistent and messy regulations at both state and federal levels. For
249

Grinberg, supra note 63, at 203 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed.
2009) and State v. Quackenbush, 98 Minn. 515, 520–21 (1906), respectively).
250
Teigland, Yetis, & Larsson, supra note 62, at 8 (quoting Ron Finberg, A Closer Look
at Coinsetter and its Bitcoin ECN Trading Platform, FOREX MAGNATES (Apr. 26, 2013),
http://forexmagnates.com/a-closer-look-at-coinsetter-and-its-bitcoin-ecn-trading-platform/).
251
Id. at 10–11.
252
Id. at 10.
253
Id. at 11–12. But cf. Craig Trudell, Bitcoin Meets Tesla with Lamborghini
Dealership’s Model S Sale, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 7, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2013-12-06/bitcoin-meets-tesla-in-california-dealership-model-s-transaction.html
(discussing sale of Tesla Model S using Bitcoins).
254
Teigland, Yetis, & Larsson, supra note 62, at 11–12.
255
See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a)(1)-(6) (West 2014).
256
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.2 (2006) (Regulation Y); Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 363 (1986).
257
Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1304.01 (West 2013) (adopting the U.C.C.
definition in § 4-105) with N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-2-3 (West 2012) (applying federal
definition in 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) (2011)) and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-307 (West 2013)
(applying the federal Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)).
258
Standage, supra note 104.
259
Bollen, supra note 61, at 285–87.
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example, Singapore’s rapidly developing economy is subject to a single
regulatory agency, which includes oversight of both banking and insurance.260 In the U.S., in addition to the myriad regulators, definitions of
banking also differ.
7. U.S. Coinage Act of 1965?
The U.S. Coinage Act of 1965 states that U.S. “coins and currency (including Federal Reserve notes ...) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver are not legal tender for debts.”261
This suggests that the U.S. Coinage Act of 1965 also is inapplicable to altcoins, crypto-currencies, and other digital assets such as Bitcoins.
8. Foreign Exchange (FOREX) Instruments?
Simply put, “foreign currencies are generally not considered to be a security.”262 As one author asserted, “[b]ecause Bitcoin is not formally backed
by a country’s government, it is not bound by the IMF’s guidelines. As a
result, Bitcoin poses a serious threat to the economic stability of the foreign
currency exchange if it continues to grow in both value and usage.”263
Seemingly confirming that FOREX is not applicable, a person must exchange the currency of one or more countries to be considered a dealer in
foreign exchange.264 Because Bitcoins are not a foreign currency representing legal tender of any nation, the U.S. foreign exchange laws and
regulations do not appear to apply to Bitcoins and virtual currencies.
9. Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Laws?
Several laws aimed at targeting alleged terrorist financing activities may
apply to Bitcoins or the exchanges, including the Money Laundering Control
Act of 1986 (MLCA).265 The MLCA subjects persons to criminal sanctions
for conducting or attempting to conduct, with knowledge of the unlawful
origin of the property in the financial transaction, financial transactions
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Id. at 289.
31 U.S.C.A. § 5103 (West 2014).
262
Kaplanov, supra note 74, at 161 (citing Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg,
What Is A Security Under the Federal Securities Laws?, 56 ALB. L. REV. 473, 483 (1993)).
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31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(1) (2012).
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“which in fact involve[] the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.”266 Additionally, the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and the related regulations promulgated
by FinCEN collectively subject money transmitting or servicing businesses to
potential criminal or civil penalties for their failure to register with FinCEN.267 Failing to register may subject international persons to liability so
long as affected persons are located in the United States.268 In March 2013,
using authority granted under the BSA,269 FinCEN issued interpretive guidance on “virtual currencies,” which seem to cover Bitcoin.270 FinCEN’s
guidance expressly acknowledged the flaw articulated in this Section; that
is, FinCEN’s comments “should not be interpreted as a statement by FinCEN about the extent to which those activities comport with other federal or
state statutes, rules, regulations, or orders.”271 While providing some clarification specific only to FinCEN’s position on virtual currencies, the lack of a
consistent or coherent broad scheme of regulatory definitions, norms, and
understandings led to FinCEN’s interpretive guidance adding to the confusion surrounding the subject.
266

Id. The MLCA contributed to the decimation of E-Gold. See Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Digital Currency Business E-Gold Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering
and Illegal Money Transmitting Charges (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.justice
.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-crm-635.html.
267
31 U.S.C.A. § 5330(a)(1) (West 2014) (“Any person who owns or controls a money
transmitting business shall register the business (whether or not the business is licensed as a
money transmitting business in any State)” with FinCEN). See also Amendment to the
Bank Secrecy Act Regulations—Definitions Relating to, and Registration of, Money
Services Businesses, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,438, 45,438 n.1 (Aug. 20, 1999) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. pt. 103); 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380 (2006).
268
See, e.g., Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Definitions and Other Regulations
Related to Money Services Businesses, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,585, 43,588 (July 21, 2011) (to
be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1021, 1022) (indicating that a person qualifies as a
money services business (MSB) because of its activity in the U.S. and asserting that
“[t]his proposal arose out of the recognition that the Internet and other technological
advances make it increasingly possible for persons to offer MSB services ... from foreign
locations.”); Press Release, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN Clarifies
Money Services Business Definitions: Rule Includes Foreign-Located MSBs Doing
Business in U.S. (July 18, 2011), http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/pdf/20110715.pdf.
269
Treas. Order 180-01, supra note 14.
270
FinCEN Guidance FIN-2013-G001, supra note 15. The Guidance attempted to “clarify
the applicability of the regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act (‘BSA’) to persons
creating, obtaining, distributing, exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual currencies.
Such persons are referred to ... as ‘users,’ ‘administrators,’ and ‘exchangers’ …. A user of a
virtual currency is not an MSB under FinCEN’s regulations and therefore is not subject to
MSB registration, reporting, and recordkeeping regulations.” Having said that, “an
administrator or exchanger is an MSB under FinCEN’s regulations,” and “[a]n administrator
or exchanger is not a ... dealer in foreign exchange, under FinCEN’s regulations.” Id.
271
Id. at 1 n.1.
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For example, FinCEN provides four definitions for currency (referred to
by FinCEN as “real currency”),272 virtual currencies,273 “centralized convertible virtual currencies,”274 and “[d]e-centralized convertible virtual currencies,”275 that seem to encompass Bitcoins. Specifically, FinCEN stated:
In contrast to real currency, “virtual” currency is a medium of exchange
that operates like a currency in some environments, but does not have all
the attributes of real currency. In particular, virtual currency does not have
legal tender status in any jurisdiction. This guidance addresses “convertible” virtual currency. This type of virtual currency either has an equivalent
value in real currency, or acts as a substitute for real currency.276

Furthermore, FinCEN stated that the rules that apply to brokers and
dealers of e-currency and e-precious metals are the same as those that apply to brokers and dealers of real currencies “since the definition of a
money transmitter does not differentiate between real currencies and convertible virtual currencies….”277
Essentially, what this dictate means is that persons who either broker
or conduct an exchange in Bitcoins are subject to FinCEN regulation as
an MSB, but typical purchasers and sellers would not be subject to FinCEN regulation.278
10. Other Federal Regulators?
In early 2014, just weeks after Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet
Yellen indicated in response to a U.S. senator’s letter to U.S. financial regulators279 that Bitcoins could not be regulated by the Fed “in any way,”280
272

Id. (defining currency or “real” currency as “the coin and paper money of the
United States or of any other country that [i] is designated as legal tender and that [ii]
circulates and [iii] is customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the
country of issuance”).
273
Id.
274
Id. at 4.
275
Id. at 5.
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Id. at 1.
277
Id. at 4.
278
Bollen, supra note 61, at 285–86.
279
Letter from Joe Manchin III, U.S. Senator, to Jacob Lew, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of
Treasury, et al. (Feb. 26, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Man
chinBitcoinLetter.pdf.
280
Steven Russolillo, Yellen on Bitcoin: Fed Doesn’t Have Authority to Regulate It in
Any Way, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2014, 12:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014
/02/27/yellen-on-bitcoin-fed-doesnt-have-authority-to-regulate-it-in-any-way/. Chairwoman
Yellen stated, “To the best of my knowledge there’s no intersection at all, in any way,
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New York State sought to regulate crypto-currencies via a “BitLicense” to
regulate virtual currency exchanges.281 The statements by Senator Manchin
and by the New York Department of Financial Services appear to be political posturing when the explicitly apolitical Federal Reserve282 has taken a
different position.
E. Synthesis
Rhys Bollen asserted that “[m]ost regulatory regimes are not well designed to cater” to a decentralized peer-to-peer payment system and suggested a regulatory regime that is broad, outcomes-focused, and technology neutral.283 The problem, however, is that financial engineers will
always be ahead of regulation, and regulation will then attempt to overregulate to make up for the initial lack of regulation and to cast a broad net
to catch as much potentially future conduct as possible.284 Such a policy is
not wise when dealing with economic activities in which efficiency should
be maximized and frictional costs minimized, so long as harmed parties
may seek redress.
One potential action would simply be a requirement for exchanges to
pay premiums to a third-party insurer of the exchange’s choice (i.e., a privatized and competitive model of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for banks or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) for defined benefit pension plans). Persons wishing to participate
in any voluntary transaction can choose the exchange they wish based on a
number of factors including best execution, reputation, trading volume, as
well as the insurer of the exchange. Requiring mandatory insurance for
voluntary financial transactions is far more similar to states requiring automobile drivers to purchase insurance than it is to mandating the purchase
between Bitcoin and banks that the Federal Reserve has the ability to supervise and regulate.
So the Fed doesn’t have authority to supervise or regulate Bitcoin in anyway.”
281
Press Release, N.Y. State Dep’t. of Fin. Servs., NYDFS Issues Public Order on
Virtual Currency Exchanges (Mar. 11, 2014), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about
/po_vc_03112014.htm; Paul Vigna, Lawsky’s Office Starts Taking Applications for the
‘BitLicense’, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 11, 2014, 2:16PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/20
14/03/11/lawskys-office-starts-taking-applications-for-the-bitlicense/.
282
See, e.g., Current FAQs, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12799.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014); Thomas
Gaudet, The Politics of the Federal Reserve, HARV. POL. REV. (May 24, 2011, 12:40 AM),
http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/the-politics-of-the-federal-reserve/.
283
Id. at 292.
284
See, e.g., IRS Notice 2014-21, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf (taxing
convertible virtual currencies as property, rather than as currencies).
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of insurance for individual health care. Moreover, insurance of this type
continues to support a broad array of experimentation and incubation
among insurers, exchanges, and parties, in terms of transactions, rather
than dictating that all definitions and policies be dictated by a single regulatory body, such as in Singapore.285
The most active Bitcoin Forum member identified by Tiegland, Yetis
and Larsson was Phinnaeus Gage, who “founded and ... maintains
Bitcoin100, a kickstarter for non-profits that implement a Bitcoin donation
option onto their websites.”286 Additionally, no story would be complete
without the famed Winklevoss twins, portrayed in the film The Social
Network as the co-founders of Facebook duped by Mark Zuckerberg.287
Sure enough, in early 2013, the Winklevoss twins announced the launch of
a hedge fund in Bitcoins.288 Thanks to finally enacted and much delayed
rules by the SEC, violating the timing of its enabling statute,289 hedge
funds like the Winklevoss’s can now advertise any way they would like
for financing their venture to any potential investor, including on crowdfunding portals such as Kickstarter.
III. CROWDFUNDING, KICKSTARTER, AND COMMISSION CONSTRAINTS
Crowdfunding provides financial capital to individuals and small business ventures by crowdsourcing individual investors via the world wide
web, without traditional financial intermediaries or underwriters.290 Crowdfunding has been defined as “the practice of funding a project or venture
by raising many small amounts of money from a large number of people,
285

Id. at 289.
Teigland, Yetis, & Larsson, supra note 62, at 12.
287
THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Sony Pictures 2010); see also Plot Summary for The
Social Network, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1285016/plotsummary (last visited
Feb. 24, 2014).
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Nathaniel Popper & Peter Lattman, Winklevoss Twins Plan First Fund for
Bitcoins, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2013, 8:53 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/01
/first-name-in-the-first-fund-for-bitcoins-winklevoss/?_r=0; Nathaniel Popper & Peter
Lattman, Never Mind Facebook; Winklevoss Twins Rule in Digital Money, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 11, 2013, 3:11 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/11/as-big-investors-emer
ge-bitcoin-gets-ready-for-its-close-up/.
289
See Goad, supra note 11.
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Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. BUS.
VENTURING 1, 2–3 (2014). See also Heather L. Traeger, Theodore W. Kassinger, & Zachary
D. Kaufman, Democratizing Entrepreneurship: An Overview of the Past, Present, and
Future of Crowdfunding, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://about.bloomberglaw
.com/practitioner-contributions/democratizing-entrepreneurship-an-overview-of-the-past-p
resent-and-future-of-crowdfunding/.
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typically via the Internet.”291 Another definition stated that crowdfunding
“emerged as [a] novel way for entrepreneurial ventures to secure funds
without having to seek out venture capital ....”292 Having said that, crowdfunding remains a relatively unknown subject to academia, despite the
enormity of the practice.293 Nonetheless, entrepreneurs may engage in four
types of crowd-funding:
1.
2.

3.
4.

donation-based, which permits investors, or “donors,” to invest in a project
without receiving (or expecting) a return from the project creator;
reward-based, which sanctions investors, or “contributors,” to contribute
capital to project creators in return for a nominal reward worth less than the
investment given;
equity-based, which permits certain investors to provide capital in return for
a stake in the company or dividend; and
debt-based (sometimes referred to as “peer-to-peer (‘P2P’) lending” or, at
times, “microlending”), which allows many lenders to loan small monetary
amounts to borrowers.294

Congress broadly defined crowdfunding in the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 295 as “Capital Raising Online,”296 a bill that
President Obama called “a potential game changer” for small businesses
and start-ups.297 Crowdfunding has the potential to help entrepreneurs assuage the challenges of obtaining—and the associated friction costs of
raising—startup capital. While crowdfunding may represent an approach
better suited for today’s technological environment, due to securities laws
and regulations, crowdfunding is only partially disruptive to traditional

291

Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the Economy, FORBES
(Nov. 27, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is-cr
owdfunding-and-how-does-it-benefit-the-economy/ (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
292
Mollick, supra note 290, at 2.
293
See id. at 1 (“Despite over a billion dollars spent by millions of individual crowdfunding
backers, ... even basic academic knowledge of the dynamics of crowdfunding is lacking….”). A
fifth method of crowdfunding has recently emerged, which is royalty-based crowdfunding and is
the subject of a separate article. See, e.g., MASSOLUTION, 2013CF: THE CROWDFUNDING
INDUSTRY REPORT 19 (2013), available at http://research.crowdsourcing.org/2013cf-crowd
funding-industry-report.
294
Id. at 3. See also D. Scott Freed, Crowdfunding as a Platform for Raising Small
Business Capital, 45 MD. BAR J. 12, 13 (July–Aug. 2012).
295
See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106,
126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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Id. § 301, 126 Stat. at 315. See also supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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Mollick, supra note 290, at 2.
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debt and equity capital campaigns, and funding from the crowd comes in a
variety of flavors.
A. Reward and Donation-Based Crowdfunding
1. Reward-Based Crowdfunding
Reward-based crowdfunding generally entails raising capital to fund
some sort of creative project from which contributors receive some form
of reward, tangible or otherwise, in exchange for contributions that reach a
certain monetary benchmark.298 Because investors only receive nonmonetary perks—such as the goods funded by the capital, a credit in a
crowdfunded film or television production, or an opportunity to meet with
an actor from that production—reward-based crowdfunding is more of
“goodie-bag” crowdfunding.299 With no expectation of a financial return,
reward-based capital providers essentially pay for whatever the goodie bag
entails.300 Doing so avoids the scope of current securities laws and SEC rules
and regulations, which do not govern reward-based crowdfunding because a
goodie bag does not constitute a “security.”301 Reward-based crowfunding
platforms include Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and Rockethub. Kickstarter and
Indiegogo are the two most popular reward-based crowdfunding platforms,
although many other platforms exist throughout the world.302
Kickstarter uses an “all or nothing” funding strategy from which project creators receive contributed funds only if the project creator’s defined
funding goal is met, within a set time period.303 Indiegogo permits project
creators to receive any funds contributed, without having to meet a set
monetary funding goal.304 In 2012, approximately 2.2 million people from
177 countries pledged approximately $319.8 million to fund a total of
18,109 projects through Kickstarter.305 Ten percent of films submitted to
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the 2012 Sundance Film Festival also received funding via Kickstarter.306
Further, in March 2013 the Veronica Mars Movie Project generated approximately $2 million, reaching the project’s funding goal, within the
first 11 hours of the campaign being posted on Kickstarter.307 Subsequently, more than 91,000 backers contributed amounts totaling approximately
$5.7 million within the 30-day time period.308 Project creators have also
enjoyed a significant amount of success crowdfunding through Indiegogo.
For instance, an 18-year-old film director raised almost $6,000 on Indiegogo in just a couple days after previewing a trailer of her movie, “My
Sucky Teen Romance,” at a comic book convention.309
Reward-based crowdfunding platforms, however, suffer from considerable drawbacks.310 For example, because raising capital via crowdfunding
is available to the public, such access can adversely impact project creators
in several ways. First, crowdfunding provides information to third parties
regarding how much capital an entrepreneur raised. Second, a failure to
deliver on a successfully crowdfunded project may result in negative consequences for the project creator, including a loss of reputational capital.311
Nonetheless, even though crowdfunding entails many risks for both
the contributor and the entrepreneur, crowdfunding continues to surge in
popularity. In 2013, crowdfunding is expected to raise $5.1 billion globally—far more than the aggregate market for virtual currencies.312
2. Donation-Based Crowdfunding
Donation-based crowdfunding typically involves raising funds for some
social cause from which donors receive no tangible return. Donation-based
2012, Countries, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/year/2012?ref=footer#coun
tries (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
306
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o-fan-financing.html.
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?articleid=2647.
310
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npost.com/2013/01/15/failed-kickstarter-project-seth-quest-hanfreeipad_n_2479798.html;
see also Markowitz, supra note 310.
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funding platforms include: (1) Gofundme, (2) Razoo, and (3) Crowdrise.
Investors provide capital but do not receive anything in return for their
contribution other than feelings of goodwill. The charitable donations,
however, may fund for-profit enterprises.313 Since donors receive no consideration, donation-based crowdfunding does not fall under the purview
of the SEC regulations and rules promulgated thereunder.314
B. Debt-Based Crowdfunding
Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending is a debt-based form of crowdfunding that
uses an online platform to connect borrowers with individual lenders. P2P
lending has generated billions of dollars in loans during a time when consumers and small businesses “faced reduced access to credit from banks and
credit unions.”315 P2P lending platforms have revolutionized community
lending by providing “searchable electronic marketplaces, standardized loan
contracts, borrower creditworthiness data, and loan servicing,” and generating large volumes of small loans between anonymous individuals.316
Microloan concepts are nearly as historical as metal coinage, since microloans have appeared in fourth-century China (lun hui), and at other times
and places, such as Ghana (susus), India (chit funds), Mexico (tandas), Bolivia (pansanaku), and Bangladesh (the Grameen Bank in the 1970s).317
The Internet has created an environment for P2P microlending. As
Paul Slattery describes, “[f]or borrowers, P2P lending platforms offer debt
consolidation, increased access to liquidity, and significantly less racial
and sexual discrimination than traditional lenders.”318 For lenders, P2P
lending platforms offer accessible portfolio diversification and socially
conscious investing. Lenders involved in the P2P lending model provide
short-term funds and expect repayment.319
Since traditional lenders generally intend to bundle and securitize
loans, certain borrowers may be overlooked either because the borrower
has an “unusual profile” or because the borrower poses a credit risk. P2P
lenders, on the other hand, have an opportunity to lend to these overlooked
313
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315
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316
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Winter 2013, at 30, 30.
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borrowers based on the intrinsic monetary value of the loan or based on
purely social value (i.e., philanthropy).
P2P lending also has drawbacks. For borrowers, these platforms may
create privacy risks. P2P platforms collect and store large amounts of personal data, including credit and identification information.320 P2P platforms can also sell borrower information or hackers can steal borrower
information as a result of P2P platforms implementing inadequate information security systems.321 For lenders, the major risk is the fact that the
borrower can default—much like traditional loans. Additionally, the P2P
lender runs the risk of losing money if borrowers do not pay back enough
of the loan to generate interest.
Some platforms only provide a return of the principal of the loan to the
lender.322 Other platforms provide interest on the funds investors loan to
borrowers.323 Thus, P2P lending platforms are differentiated into two categories, those from which lenders receive no interest and those from
which lenders receive interest.324
1. Non-Interest Bearing MicroLoans
Kiva is considered the leading “non-interest bearing” platform.325 Instead of lending to entrepreneurs directly, Kiva partners with “field partners,” which include international microfinancing institutions and non-profit
organizations.326 Kiva posts entrepreneur loan requests on the Kiva website.327 Individual lenders can loan any amount, from $25 to the full requested amount, through the Kiva website.328 Kiva collects and distributes the
320

Slattery, supra note 315, at 245.
Id.
322
Devashis Mitra, The Role of Crowdfunding in Entrepreneurial Finance, 13:2
DELHI BUS. REV., July–Dec. 2012, at 67, 69.
323
Id.
324
Id.
325
Until 2009, Kiva was originally not open to entrepreneurs in the United States. See
Tamara Schweitzer, Microloans for All?, INC. (June 10, 2009), http://www.inc.com/the-ki
va-connection/2009/06/microloans_for_all.html; Michael Liedtke, Kiva to Feed CashStarved US Small Businesses, USA TODAY (June 10, 2009, 9:51 AM), http://www.usatoday
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2014).
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ore (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
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funds the individual lender agrees to loan back to the field partners, crediting lenders with any repayments the entrepreneur makes.329 Lenders receive
payment of the principal and the field partners use any interest to cover operating and transactional costs.330 Since lenders do not receive any interest
and Kiva.org is a non-profit organization, Kiva.org remains free from SEC
regulation.331
2. Interest-Bearing Microloans
Both Prosper and Lending Club dominate the market with respect to
interest-bearing debt-based crowdfunding.332 These platforms provide an
online marketplace that allows potential borrowers to anonymously seek
individual loans. Prospective borrowers make the case to receive funding
by posting narratives and consent to be subjected to a credit check.333 Potential creditors (lenders) browse the debtors’ applications and fund loans
at platform-determined interest rates.334 Paul Slattery states that “[b]oth
platforms contract with an FDIC-insured bank to execute loans, and both
issue notes to lenders dependent on borrower payment streams.”335 Debtors request loans ranging from $2,000 to $35,000 and lenders can agree to
loan a monetary amount as low as $25.336 Originally, debtors issued promissory notes directly to creditors on both crowdfunding platforms, while
the site maintained “custody of the notes and service[ed] [the debts] for a
1 % fee.”337 Now, creditors directly buy notes issued by either Prosper or
Lending Club, and the funds from those purchases are used by both sites
to make loans through WebBank.338 These platforms reduce the costs of
extending credit by eliminating “unnecessary ... services ... associated with
traditional intermediaries.”339
329
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331
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In lieu of a service fee, Prosper and Lending Club charge debtors an
origination fee for each lending transaction.340 The amount of the origination fee is proportional to the perceived credit risk for each borrower, taking
into consideration factors such as credit scores.341 Lending Club determines
the debtor’s “loan grade” and assigns an interest rate for each loan accordingly.342 Lending Club measures the debtor’s credit risk by evaluating the
debtor’s loan application and credit history.343 Alternatively, Prosper rates
each loan to set a minimum rate but an auction-like process determines the
actual interest rate assigned to the loan.344 Generally, P2P lenders provide
loans to borrowers having difficulty obtaining credit through traditional
channels.345 Crowdfunded interest-bearing microloans are subject to securities regulation.346
C. Equity Crowdfunding and Associated Restrictions
Because only one type of crowdfunding provides an unlimited upside
return on an investment as well as internal governance control mechanisms,347 the most meaningful crowdfunding type is equity crowdfunding.
Further, equity-based crowdfunding comprises about 15 percent of the total crowdfunding market and raised the most funds per project, as compared to donation and reward-based crowdfunding.348
The JOBS Act aimed to create jobs, in part, by incentivizing investors to
finance entrepreneurial small business ventures through allowing capital
contributors to receive a financial interest without registering the offering
with the SEC.349 The JOBS Act arguably represented a means of facilitating
340
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opportunities for middle class investors, entrepreneurs, and workers to benefit from an ease in the exchange of capital among parties.
When an entrepreneur exchanges an equity interest in their start-up for
cash investment, a potential problem exists because the entrepreneur seeking capital may have issued “securities.”350 Congress passed the JOBS
Act, at least in part, to facilitate equity crowdfunding.351 Instead of choosing to employ debt financing, an entrepreneur can seek capital from investors who, in exchange for their investment in the startup, receive an equity
interest in the startup.352 Obtaining outside financing can be a challenging
proposition.353 The frictional costs of raising outside capital can be high,
both in terms of financial and governance give-ups, including board seats,
to the venture capital investors.354 Until September 2013, a prohibition existed on businesses engaging in solicitation of securities to the general
public (general solicitation).355 With this prohibition removed, one may
initially and intuitively believe that equity crowdfunding might disrupt or
even replace traditional equity financing mechanisms. But such a belief is
in large part misplaced.
The Crowdfund Provision “authorizes the ‘crowdfunding’ of securities,
defined as the sale of unregistered securities over the Internet to large numbers of retail investors, each of whom only invests a small dollar
amount.”356 The Crowdfund Provision provides an exemption allowing the
issuance of unregistered securities.357 Such an exemption lowers the barriers
VENTURE CAPITAL, 135, 135 (2012); Tit. III, Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS)
Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (codified as amended
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350
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351
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352
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to entry for small businesses to obtain equity capital by: (a) lowering agency
costs associated with acceding to mandatory SEC registration and disclosure requirements; (b) lowering marketing and promotional costs traditionally correlating with issuing equity to the public; and (c) increasing the ease
of obtaining equity capital by small businesses.358
Yet meaningful equity-based crowdfunding remains currently available
only to accredited investors.359 Broadly speaking, an accredited individual
investor is a natural person whose: (a) net worth exceeds $1 million; or
(b) individual annual income exceeds $200,000.360 As Professor Usha
Rodrigues wrote, “[s]ecurities law’s dirty little secret is that rich investors
have access to special kinds of investments ... that everyone else does not
.... [T]he law assumes that the average investor needs the protection of
the full panoply of securities regulation and thus should be limited to
buying public securities.”361
Unaccredited investors are not permitted to participate in equity-based
crowdfunding until the SEC passes appropriate rules and regulations, pursuant to the JOBS Act; when the SEC will do so is anyone’s guess. Section
201 of the JOBS Act required the SEC to “revise its rules” with respect to
the ban on Regulation D [Section 506] solicitations “not later than 90 days”
after the enactment of the Act.362 That did not occur until July 2013, more
than 365 days later than required by the JOBS Act.363 These changes, effective September 2013, permit for so-called general solicitation of securities to
anyone.364 Only accredited investors, however, may actually invest in the
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enterprises that advertise using general solicitation.365 While the SEC released proposed equity crowdfunding rules in October 2013, these proposed
rules asked numerous questions, and no one is certain when, or if, the equity
crowdfunding rules will become effective, thus permitting small investors
and enterprises to exchange equity for financial capital.
Also, section 108 of the Act required the SEC “[n]ot later than 180
days after the date of enactment of this title” to issue such rules as may be
necessary to carry out the amendments contained in section 301 of the
JOBS Act.366 While individuals face penalties for violating the securities
laws, the SEC faces no penalty for failing to fulfill certain obligations contained in these and various other portions of the JOBS Act.367 In addition,
“[b]y law, the SEC cannot revisit the actual definition of accredited investor
status until 2014,”368 and the JOBS Act limits the amount that entrepreneurs can raise via crowdfunding at $1 million,369 and this amount fails to
include the proposed material legal and accounting compliance costs.
These restrictions are unproductive for entrepreneurs, middle-class investors, workers, and the economy as a whole. First, the restrictions harm
entrepreneurs because the constraints limit capital, lowering amounts to
numbers far below what traditional equity investments can provide. In addition, should the business raise more than $1 million in crowdfunded equity,
it faces potential liability under the Securities Act.370 Furthermore, the entrepreneurial firm may not crowdfund more than $1 million in any twelvemonth period. For example, game console developer Ouya crowdfunded
approximately $950,000 in eight hours on Kickstarter.371 What legitimate
policy rationale could exist to prevent that company from crowdfunding
additional capital?
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Second, these provisions do not help individual middle-class investors,
as those investors may only provide $2,000 in crowdfunded capital (if
those investors have a financial net worth below $100,000) or ten percent of
an investor’s financial net worth, should the investor have a financial net
worth between $100,000 and $999,999.99.372 No meaningful reason exists
to cap what an individual saves, spends, gives away, or invests to a particular entity based on an arbitrary appraisal of a concept as slippery as “net
worth.”373 By restricting the equity crowdfunding contributions in these
ways, the so-called JOBS Act374 does not help businesses create many positive net present value projects that would lead to a growth in the jobs base
or an expansion of the productions possibilities frontier for the economy
as a whole.375
A proffered reason for the securities regulations that act as crowdfunding
constraints is to avoid potential investor fraud,376 so as to keep with the
372
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SEC’s oft-repeated policy to protect the interests of the public investor.377
Some high-ranking members of the SEC take their nanny-statism quite seriously. For example, SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar wrote that he opposed loosening constraints for individual non-accredited investors.378 Aguilar asserted that removing those obstacles to middle-class investment in equiequity crowdfunded startups via general solicitation, such as Kickstarter,
would “come at the expense of investors and place investors at greater
risk.”379 Aguilar continued, “without additional protections, general solicitation makes fraud easier and enforcement more difficult .... [and] [e]xperience
tells us that this will lead to economic disaster for many investors.”380
While Commissioner Aguilar’s experience may tell him hyperbolically
of many forthcoming economic disasters as a result of the easier fraud and
increased risk that will occur when bureaucrats afford the slightest increase
in freedom to middle-class equity crowdfunders, the empirical data related
to unregulated crowdfunding—as opposed to Commissioner Aguilar’s
experience—tells otherwise. Specifically, Wharton Professor Ethan Mollick examined metadata including approximately 48,500 crowdfunded projects that raised over $237 million.381 All of these projects were patronage

377
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or reward-based crowdfunding,382 and all projects were funded on Kickstarter, which is “the largest and dominant crowdfunding site.”383
Like Bitcoin, Kickstarter started in 2009.384 As mentioned earlier,
Kickstarter has no intermediary besides itself.385 Additionally, Kickstarter
has no enforcement mechanism for funded entities that fail to deliver their
promised goods.386 As a result, a number of similarities exist between
Bitcoin and Kickstarter. Mollick acknowledged that “[f]or the dishonest,
[crowdfunding] creates an opportunity for fraud.”387 Yet, of these many
Kickstarted projects he studied, Mollick found that fraud was “very rare.”388
Although a number of projects delivered their goods on a delayed basis,
only $21,324 of contributed capital failed to receive a response from the
funded entity.389 Mollick asserted that “[f]or crowdfunding intermediaries
and policy makers, there are also clear implications.... [T]he rate of fraud
in crowdfunding is currently very low,” though that may not remain so in
the future or in all crowdfunding forms.390
From the perspective of using policy and legal instruments to hinder
entrepreneurial growth, Commissioner Aguilar’s nanny-statism was based
on his “experience,” rather than informed by evidence created specifically
for policymakers. More broadly, the government’s lingering and numerous
restrictions on equity crowdfunding seem particularly poorly chosen for
middle-class entrepreneurs, investors, job-seekers, employees, and the
economy as a whole.
As a result, middle-class investors are thus relegated to receiving essentially goods with no governance rights, while the wealthy or high-income
accredited, so-called “sophisticated,” and institutional investors retain the
ability to receive the lion’s share of any equity return and any associated
governance rights with funding the venture, pushing the entrepreneur to a
less influential role. As a result, the unsubstantiated popular delusions of
fraud that led to the madness of crowdfunding constraints continue to favor
large businesses and wealthy or high-earning individual investors over entrepreneurs, their enterprises, their potential middle-class investors, their
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potential future employees, and the nation’s potential future economic
growth. This ultimately harms the crowd in the name of protecting it.
IV. A HETERODOX PROSCRIPTIVE PROPOSAL FOR A PLURALISTIC PARLEY ON
THE PARADOX
Thus far, this Article has demonstrated that both Bitcoins and Kickstarter as respective virtual currencies, and crowdfunding platforms share
the following characteristics. First, both virtual currencies and crowdfunding represent Internet-based mediums of consideration exchange.391 Second, both exchanges involve over $1 billion annually, with crowdfunding
exchanges representing approximately $3 billion more per year than virtual currencies.392 Third, neither platform features any intermediary besides
itself.393 Fourth, a strong potential exists that future crowdfunding platforms will accept Bitcoins or other virtual currencies.394 Fifth, middleclass investors lack any meaningful governance rights when investing in
either Bitcoins or a Kickstarter-backed entity.395 Yet, despite these operational similarities, a striking paradox exists relative to the government’s
ability to insert itself in entrepreneurial development, post–GreatRecession economic redevelopment.
Specifically, despite their volatile boom-to-bust bubbles that have demonstrably harmed those who speculated in Bitcoins, recent attempts to employ weak—and beyond exchange registration under FinCEN—tangential
enforcement instruments relative to virtual currencies demonstrate that
virtual currencies essentially are above the law and escape regulation in
today’s U.S. economy.396 In contrast, the initial empirical data on unregulated crowdfunded entities suggest that no material fraud or risk to capital
providers exists.397 Yet, the SEC’s response to the JOBS Act’s mandate of
391
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See supra Part III.C and accompanying text. These corporate governance rights are
lacking for most investors, because most are middle-class, non-accredited, nonsophisticated, and non-institutional investors whose ability to invest in a project’s equity
is capped by securities regulation, leaving believers in a project who still want to
contribute capital relegated to goodie bag consideration, lacking any governance rights to
control the funded enterprise. This reality appears to be a poor use of regulatory
instruments from a policy perspective.
396
See supra Part II.C.
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See Hazen, supra note 376, at 1737.
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general solicitation and to thoughts of permitting the average investor to
equity crowdfund entities (thus securing some control rights) has been delayed, paternalistic, and devoid of evidence in the name of “protecting”
the investor from “risk.”398
A. Why Employ an Acerbic Model of Economic Heterodoxy as the
Article’s Analytic Supporting this Article’s Proposal?
Admittedly, much of this Article’s reliance on a Hayekian-Austrian
economic analytic legitimately could cause the reader to believe that this
Article represents nothing more than the modern manifesto of a radically
capitalistic libertarian. That is not the case, however. Any of the diverse
heterodox economic theories—ranging from Marxian to post-Keynesian to
Austrian to Sraffian to behavioral, among others399—theoretically could
have served as the lens through which this Article challenges the neoclassical economic assumptions that have served as the basis on which
U.S. economic and monetary policy have rested for decades.400
Although heterodox economics may have multiple understandings—
whether methodologically, ontologically, epistemologically, or pedagogically401—most heterodox economic branches seek a common pluralism402
because they are outside of mainstream orthodox, neo-classical economic
thought.403 To reach a common pluralism, each heterodox economics strand
398

See supra note 378 and accompanying text.
I employed some of these in prior research analyses both within and outside this
Article. See, e.g., supra Part II.C.3. (discussing behavioral economics and applying it to
Bitcoins); Dylan P. Grady, Charter School Revocation: A Method for Efficiency,
Accountability, and Success, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 513 (2012) (quoting David Groshoff,
Uncharted Territory: Market Competition’s Constitutional Collision with Entrepreneurial
Sex-Segregated Charter Schools, 2 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307, 308 (2010)).
400
See, e.g., Frederic S. Lee, The Emergence of Heterodox Economics, 1990–2006,
ASS’N FOR HETERODOX ECON, available at http://www.hetecon.net/division.php?page=ab
out&side=history_of_heterodox_economics (derived from FREDERIC S. LEE, A HISTORY OF
HETERODOX ECONOMICS: CHALLENGING THE MAINSTREAM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
ch. 10 (2009)); Andrew Mearman, Who Do Heterodox Economists Think They Are?, 70
AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 480, 480 (2011) [hereinafter Mearman, Heterodox Economists];
ANDREW MEARMAN, TEACHING HETERODOX ECONOMIC CONCEPTS 3–4 Figure 2 (2007).
401
Andrew Mearman, Pluralism and Heterodoxy: Introduction to the Special Issue, 1
J. PHIL. ECON. 5, 5–10 (2008) [hereinafter Mearman, Pluralism].
402
Id. at 12–13. This Article sprinkled pluralistic views of both heterodox and neoclassical economists in its early material. See, e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text.
403
See, e.g., Barkley Rosser, Jr. et al., How Can Something so Right as Heterodox
Economics Have so Little Influence?, 7–8, 11–13 (Sept. 12, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://cob.jmu.edu/rosserjb/Friendly%209%2012%2012%20final
.docx (representing the writings of three orthodox neo-classical economists, stating “[w]e
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includes its unique embrace of some, though not all, of the following descriptive understandings that clash with neo-classical economic theory: (1)
human actors are social and less than perfectly rational; (2) economic systems are complex, evolving, and unpredictable; (3) individual economic actor theories are useful generally, and theories of the economic collective are
useful for outcomes particularly; (4) human and economic history provide
important understandings to the contemporary relevance of economic
events; (5) all economic theories are fallible; (6) formal mathematical and
statistical methods do not necessarily represent the supreme method; and (7)
the importance of power404 relative to determining economic outcomes.405
Thus, despite acknowledging other economists and economic theories
throughout, this Article’s primary reliance on the Hayekian-Austrian lens
occurred because I believed this analytic represented the heterodox theory
that is the most directly applicable analytic to this research subject matter.
Specifically, Hayek’s Nobel prize-garnering theory arose from his work
involving the interdependence of: (1) money (e.g., virtual currencies and
arguably securities); (2) social phenomena and economic fluctuations
(e.g., crowds and bubbles); and (3) institutional phenomena (e.g., governments, laws, rules, policies, instruments, and financial institutions);406 synthesized with (4) the general Hayekian view of what may occur in a free
and unregulated market (e.g., Bitcoins’ ex-ante status when this Article’s
research began and, generally speaking, Bitcoins’ current ex-post status).
These reasons explain why this Article applied the often caustic analytic
of the Hayekian-Austrian heterodoxical economic model to the extant economic and legal environment. The Article aimed to arrive at a pluralistic
proscriptive framework seeking to engage other heterodox economic, legal,
and financial scholars in a dialogue. Also, the dialogue is an attempt to find
a logical common ground regarding inconsistent government application of
its instruments to emerging entrepreneurial economic (re)development activity following the U.S. Great Recession and during global economic crises
identify orthodoxy with a belief in the trinity of assumptions of rationality, greed, and
equilibrium represented by ‘neoclassical economics’ as taught in most textbooks” and
describing their view of heterodox impact on public policy).
404
Cf. David Kennedy, Speaking Law to Power: International Law and Foreign Policy
Closing Remarks, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 176, 177–78 (2005) (differentiating yet coupling
“[l]aw in the interstices of power, law as an instrument of government, as a compliance
program and management tool,” and inquiring, “[h]ow can we translate the terms used by
policy managers into the vernaculars of left-center-right, or of social interests, that we
might contest the decisions experts take in political terms....”) (emphasis added).
405
Mearman, Heterodox Economists, supra note 401, at 489.
406
See The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel
1974, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureat
es/1974/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
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in the Western nations of Greece, Spain, Cypress, in addition to other struggling, developing, or redeveloping national economies.
B. Economic Failures Exist Regardless of Regulation
As Professor Christine Hurt asserted this year, relative to the law and
economic bubbles and collapses in 2001 (post-Internet bubble) and 2008
(post-housing bubble), “state and federal laws are not good at criminalizing foolishness, even foolishness with other people’s money,”407 in part
because “individuals have different appetites for risk.”408 Professor Hurt
acknowledged that additional disclosure via SEC or agency rules would
“not be necessarily helpful information”409 to investors, given that a disclosure regime already existed during the economic collapse. Further, Hurt
explained that investors “were turned away from the courthouse door in
cases involving federal securities law claims and claims of breaches of
state law fiduciary duties,”410 but that imposing additional riskmanagement duties relative to legal, currency, business, and other risks is
impractical and would result in eliminating the business judgment rule.411
When regulated, political pressures often determine who gets sued or
prosecuted and why or why not,412 and Professor Hurt paints a picture of
stunning incompetence and potential caving to political pressure by the
SEC in the wake of the Great Recession’s multiple regulatory violations.413 Securities violations may be subject to civil, criminal, or administrative penalties.414 Penalties for computer related crimes exist as well,415
beyond those discussed above in Parts II and III. Answers are not always
found through additional or amplified statutes and regulatory schemes.
C. A Market-Based Minarchist-Statutory Proposal
Because the Hayekian view does not seek to protect people from
themselves, but recognizes the need to add a pragmatic-based theory based
407

Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk 6 (Ill. Prog. in Law, Behav. & Soc. Sci.,
Working Paper No. LBSS14-09, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2308007.
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Id. at 42.
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Id. at 44.
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Id. at 45.
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Id.
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Id. at 9–12, 10 n.45.
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Id.
414
15 U.S.C.A. § 77k (West 2014); § 77l (civil enforcement); § 78i (same); § 78j
(same); § 77x (criminal enforcement); § 78ff (same).
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18 U.S.C.A. § 3571 (West 2014); § 1030(c)(2)(B)(i) (including accessing or
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on current structural regimes to achieve a pluralistic dialogue, this section
acknowledges that risk-reduction for individual investors is economically
beneficial. This section proposes a modestly brief statutory requirement
that narrowly borrows from unnecessarily broader schemes such as those
enabling the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which serve as mandatory insurers
of banks and defined benefit pension plans, respectively, with the banks
and pension plans having to make mandatory premia based on government-determined risk premia.
This Article’s proposal, however, is to assuage middle-class persons
defrauded by a virtual currency exchange or a crowdfunding platform in a
minimally intrusive way relative to the economy’s ability to act in as free
of a market as possible.
Therefore, rather than mandate that virtual currency exchanges and
crowdfunding platforms pay the cost of potential future risk to a new regulatory agency, this Section proposes something much simpler: a requirement
that any exchange or platform show proof of insurance from a private insurance provider—not an agency like FDIC or PBGC—on the entity’s website.
Such a requirement would be similar to the requirement of certain states’
enabling legislation, which mandate benefit corporations to post verification
on their business’ websites.
1. Perceived Benefits
With this additional yet limited information, the potential capital contributor can then evaluate both the capital project itself, as well as the risk
associated with the insurance for its investment. Each exchange or platform could choose an insurer of its choice, rather than pay a bureaucratic
agency. Further, one may suspect that similar to traditional insurers, the
insurers engaged in this business would also receive third-party ratings
that may help capital contributors choose which insured exchange or platform to use. In addition, just as virtual currency exchanges have begun to
work together relative to self-regulation, one may envision a mutualized
insurer created and owned by the exchanges and crowdfunding platforms
themselves. The choice to be mutualized or demutualized would reside
with the virtual currency exchange or the crowdfunding platform.
2. Anticipated Costs
Any government interference in the marketplace creates a cost. Here,
the cost must be passed to the contributor of capital or to the entrepreneur.
As a result, the proposed statute must contain a requirement that the prior
one through five years’ of premiums be refunded to the virtual currency
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exchange or crowdfunding platform, plus interest at the (arguably) marketbased prime rate, at the insurer’s discretion at the start of the coverage
when the policy becomes bound. The remedy for a harmed party by an
insurer’s failure to return funds would be a civil suit by the exchange or
platform, because the protected risk is, of course, that of the individual
investor, who would be paid by the insurer for any fraudulent conduct.
3. How to Reduce Anticipated Costs of this Individual Investor Risk
Reduction
The insurer would have to return this amount to each investor, but insurers tend to understand how to remain long-term cash-flow positive, typically via a combination of appropriate actuarial premium pricing and duration matching of fixed-income securities. The five-year window described
above that provides the insurer with the choice of duration as to when to
return interest on the premiums provides the flexibility for the insurer to duration match over a short-to-medium term. In addition, because some capital
will leave the economy to pay for this insurance, limiting the insurer to a
five-year duration matching window provides sufficiently short timing that
it should incentivize insurers to take additional risk to achieve equity returns. As a result, the mandate is that anything beyond the market value of
the duration-matched assets must be invested in either virtual currencies or
private placements with entrepreneurial companies so that the funds as best
approximate private investors making investment in the very entrepreneurial
enterprises where evidenced bubbles and risk reduction fears exist, yet
which represent the benefit of the experimental Bitcoin exchanges and
Kickstarting platforms in the first place.
A justified counterargument to this proposal exists indicating that the
proposal encourages additional unnecessary risk-taking by insurers. The
point, however, is that the capital involved wants to be deployed to that
risk in the first place by natural persons, most of whom either cannot or
regulators do not want to engage in such risk taking. Therefore, institutional risk-taking appears to remain generally of less concern to regulators
than risk taken by middle-class holders of capital.416 As a result, this
scheme achieves as cost effectively, as briefly, and as economically intrusive as possible an econo-legal heterodox framework that employs skeletal
law and incentive maximization to mesh with a policy goal of protecting
middle-class investor capital, while still approximating a flow of capital to
entrepreneurial private equity investments.
416

See Hurt, supra note 407, passim.
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CONCLUSION
Although made in the context of international law and economic development, Harvard Law School’s David Kennedy indicated that he
would like to propose a different task for ... law—less a program of action than the conveyor of a new sensibility about law and power. A
sensibility of human freedom and responsibility, of clarity about what
we do not know, and about the power in our hands, rather than clarity
about what we know and denial of our power. Of moral action in an ...
irrational world.417

This Article attempted to embrace that heterodox philosophy and apply it to the new technologies of Bitcoin bubbles and crowdfunding constraints to help kick-start an unconventional dialogue regarding an economy bogged down via existing and threatened governmental interference
affecting middle-class entrepreneurs, investors, and jobseekers.
This Article acknowledged that economic bubbles and the madness of
crowdfunding items such as tulips to dot-coms have occurred throughout
history. But this Article also showed the benefit that microfinance has
played throughout history as well as the benefits of challenging conventional wisdom via a heterodox analytic to be informed by human reality
applied to present situations, rather than purely by theoretical impossibilities taken as the basis for this nation’s economic policies. This Article described the paradox of overregulation of securities in the disruptive crowdfunding space and the lack of meaningful regulation in the virtual currency
space to fashion a proposal as close to the heterodox paradigm from which
the problem was analyzed.
The proposal involves a minimally invasive statute with no promulgated rules or regulations thereunder. In addition, the proposal gives significant freedom to: (1) risk insurers as to how to structure their enterprises
(mutualized or demutualized) and invest (duration matching in fixedincome securities of their choosing combined with a requirement to return
the currency risk and private equity to the marketplace by more sophisticated investors); and (2) entrepreneurs, who will receive funding via a
more safeguarded public, a return on premium interest at the prime rate,
and a requirement that any funds that exceed the duration match on a present value basis must be reinvested in virtual currencies and private entrepreneurial enterprises.

417

Kennedy, supra note 404, at 181.
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Additional debate and gathering of empirical data on these issues
should occur lest law and policy makers and regulators pass uninformed
regulations designed to placate potentially fearful constituents and insulate
them the risky and poor decisions all humans are prone to make at times.
As Mackay indicated in Extraordinary Popular Delusions:
Let us not, in the pride of our superior knowledge, turn with contempt
from the follies of our predecessors. The study of the errors into which
great minds have fallen in the pursuit of truth can never be uninstructive. As the man looks back to the days of his childhood and his youth,
and recalls to his mind the strange notions and false opinions that
swayed his actions at the time, that he may wonder at them; so should
society, for its edification, look back to the opinions which governed
the ages fled.418

The U.S. should consider the uses, costs and benefits, of potential
laws, regulations, and policy instruments that can lead to over and underregulation of entrepreneurial activity that may spur economic redevelopment, employment opportunities, and general economic growth, a massive
bubble that leaves many penniless, or an unknown place on the future
economic spectrum, including at the heterodox barricade.419
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Mackay, supra note 1, at 2.
The final few words paraphrase Professor David Kennedy, Law and Development
Class Lecture at Harvard Law School (Fall Semester, 2008).
419

